Search Decisions

Decision Text

CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2010-031
Original file (2010-031.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied
 

 

 
 

 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                       BCMR Docket No. 2010-031 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX   

FINAL DECISION ON RECONSIDERATION 

This  is  a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 and section 425 of 
title  14  of  the  United  States  Code.    The  Chair  docketed  the  case  on  November  3,  2009,  and 
assigned  it  to  staff  member  J.  Andrews  to  prepare the  decision  for  the  Board  as  required by  
33 C.F.R. § 52.61(c). 
 
 
the three duly appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 

This final decision on reconsideration, dated August 12, 2010, is approved and signed by 

 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST 

 

The  applicant,  who  resigned  his  commission  as  a  lieutenant  junior  grade  (LTJG)  in  the 

Coast Guard on August 1, 2004, asked the Board to correct his record by  

 

(a) removing two officer evaluation reports (OERs) covering his service aboard a cutter as a deck 
watch officer from October 1, 2002, to January 31, 2003, and from February 1, 2003, to July 
13, 2003; 

(b)  removing  all  documentation  of  an  investigation of his  conduct  aboard the cutter, as well as 
any documents regarding and references to alleged offenses, such as having an inappropriate 
relationship; 

(c)  removing  all  documentation  of  and  relating  to  his  non-judicial  punishment  (NJP)  at  mast 

aboard the cutter; 

(d)  invalidating  and  expunging  any  administrative  actions  taken  in  whole  or  in  part  because  of 

the investigation, the NJP, and the disputed OERs; 

(e) either removing an April 11, 2003, referral to a Naval hospital for alcohol screening or, in the 
alternative,  inserting  the  hospital’s  response  to  the  command,  which  states  that  he  did  not 
have an alcohol problem and admonishes the command for wasting the hospital’s time; 

(f)  rescinding and removing his letter of resignation; 
(g) removing all documentation of and references to administrative actions to revoke his commis-

sion or otherwise terminate his Coast Guard career;  

 

 

(h) allowing him an opportunity “to return to active duty and rejoin his year group, without loss 
of numbers or precedence” and, if he accepts the opportunity, to be awarded all back pay and 
allowances from August 1, 2004, to the date of his return to active duty; and 

(i)  removing his DD 214 and DD 215. 

 
In the alternative, the applicant asked the Board to correct his DD 214 to change his narr-
ative  reason  for  separation  from  “Substandard  Performance”  to  “Miscellaneous/General  Rea-
sons”;  his  separation  code  from  BHK,  which  means  “resignation  allowed  in  lieu  of  further 
administrative separation proceedings or board actions when a member’s performance is below 
acceptable  standards,”  to  FND,  which  means  that  the  resignation  was  allowed  for  “miscellane-
ous/general reasons”; and by removing the DD 215. 
 

APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS 

 
 
The applicant alleged that on January 3, 2003, while stationed aboard the cutter, he was 
wrongly  accused  of  having  an  inappropriate  relationship  with  a  female  officer,  LTJG  X.    The 
applicant  stated that the woman had been his  classmate at the Coast Guard Academy, that they 
had been friends for some time, which is not a violation of Coast Guard policy, and that they did 
not have a romantic or inappropriate relationship. 
 
Allegations of Bias 
 

The applicant alleged that his command unjustly accused him and punished him in retali-
ation  for  an  incident  in  which  he  “observed  a  situation  during  a  migrant  interdiction  which 
resulted in deaths” on December 20, 2002, and subsequently told his father what had happened 
and  asked  his  advice  in  an  email  on  January  3,  2003.    The  applicant  alleged  that  the  incident 
occurred when his cutter found a sailboat overloaded with Haitian refugees.  While the crew was 
preparing to unload the refugees, the sailboat partially capsized and approximately thirty of them 
fell in the water.  “We recovered most of them but were unable to account for at least three refu-
gees.  We assumed they had drowned.”1  He alleged that the cutter “left the area without conduct-
ing  a  proper  search  for  the  missing  refugees.”    Moreover,  the  applicant  alleged,  at  the  cutter’s 
next stop, he heard an investigator suggest to the CO that the ship’s log be changed to show that 
a  proper  search  was  conducted  and  that  no  refugees  were  missing.    He  stated,  “I  observed  the 
entries in the vessel’s log and it appeared to me that the Captain and the Area staff officer were 
concealing the drownings.”2 

 
The  applicant  stated  that  because  he  was  uncertain  about  what  to  do,  he  informed  his 
father, a retired Coast Guard officer, of these events in an email on January 3, 2003, and asked if 

                                                 
1  The  Board  notes  that  in  his  original  application,  the  applicant  stated  that  he  believed  that  “quite  a  few  people 
drowned” but that the CO had reported that only three people had drowned. 
2 The Board notes that the three drowning were reported by the cutter in the message traffic that day.  In his original 
application, the applicant stated that the investigator asked the CO why the log did not show that they had searched 
the area and searched the sailboat for hideaways before sinking it.  When the CO stated that they had not done those 
things, the investigator advised him to change the log so that it would look as if they had or they would be in a lot of 
trouble, and the log was changed accordingly. 

 

 

he  should  report  the  matter.3  Within  hours  of  sending  the  email  to  his  father,  he  was  unjustly 
charged with having an inappropriate relationship. 

 
 The applicant alleged that his email may have been seen by the CO because the XO and 
the Operations Officer periodically checked the crew’s outgoing emails for security purposes.  He 
alleged that this was one of their duties, which “would have made it a certainty that one of them 
read [his] email and then decided on a course of action to silence or discredit [him] by bringing 
him up on false charges.”  He further alleged that because he told his father what had happened, 
the CO was reprimanded by a three-star admiral and the CO fired the Operations Officer and the 
XO.  

 
In  support  of  his  allegations  about  the  migrant  interdiction  incident,4  the  applicant  sub-
mitted  a  “Case  Report”5  that  was  opened  on  the  night  of  December  20,  2002,  and  shows  the 
message traffic resulting from the cutter’s interdiction of a migrant vessel.  The report shows that 
at  9:15  p.m.,  the  cutter,  which  was  not  nearby,  was  diverted  to  intercept  the  vessel,  which  had 
been spotted by U.S. Customs from the air.  In addition, the Coast Guard launched aircraft from 
two air stations.  At 7:10 a.m. on December 21, 2002, the cutter came in “radar contact” with the 
vessel and reported that they would “board it at first light.”  At 7:22 a.m., the cutter reported that 
the “migrants will not stop and will not take life vests.  We see approximately 40 migrants.  They 
state  that  they  are  going  to  the  Bahamas.”    The  Coast  Guard  contacted  the  Royal  Bahamas 
Defence  Force  (RBDF),  which  stated  that  it  would  interdict  the  vessel  eventually  and  that  the 
migrants  could  be  returned  by  the  Coast  Guard  or  the  RBDF.    At  7:40  a.m.,  the  cutter  was 
advised  that  the  RBDF  authorized  the  Coast  Guard  to  remove  the  migrants  by  force.    At  7:49 
a.m., CAMSLANT reported “5 migrants in the water.  At 7:58 a.m., the cutter was advised that 
the RBDF did not want the cutter to use force.  The cutter was advised to continue to try to per-
suade the migrants to take the life vests.  At 8:32 a.m., CAMSLANT reported “all PIWs [persons 
in water] recovered.  Now see at least 150 mig[rants].”  At 9:26 a.m., CAMSLANT reported that 
all 192 of the migrants were aboard the cutter and that their vessel would be destroyed because it 
was hazardous to  navigation.  The aircraft left  the area.   The cutter was  instructed to  repatriate 
the migrants in Haiti the next day.  At 1:35 p.m., GANTSEC sent the following message: 
 

[The cutter] reports that 5 migrants were initially in the water, then 15 more fell in.  All 20 PIW 
were recovered.  Once all 192 were embarked on [the cutter], migrants stated all were accounted 
for.    Later,  one  migrant  stated  3  were  missing.    No  info  on  who  was  missing  or  when they were 
lost.    [The  cutter’s]  small  boats  searched  area  for  2  hours  after  all  migrants  were  aboard.    [The 
migrants’  vessel]  left  Port  de  Paix,  Haiti,  on  19  Dec  with  a  destination  of  Nassau.  //FM  D7CC 
[District Command Center]: Request info from [the cutter] on when migrant says 3 were lost and 
who they are. 

At 1:41 p.m., more details were provided: 

 
 
                                                 
3 The applicant did not submit a copy of this email. 
4  The  applicant  alleged  that  the  December  20,  2002,  migrant  interdiction  incident  was  investigated  and  submitted 
copies  of  letters  indicating  that  in  2008  he  attempted  to  get  a  copy  of  the  report  of  the  investigation  under  the 
Freedom of Information Act.  The correspondence shows that his request was forwarded to the District Command in 
Miami and the cutter itself.  The applicant stated that although he received many pages of information, he had not 
received  a  copy  of  the  report  of  the  investigation.      He  alleged  that  the  fact  that  his  request  for  a  copy  of  the 
investigation  was  forwarded  to  the  District  Command  is  evidence  that  the  report  exists  but  is  being  wrongfully 
withheld.  
5 The Case Report was not in the record before the BCMR during the deliberations for the original decision. 

 

 

 

[Briefed] OSR/SDO on the story:  5 PIW went into the water, then with the excitement, 15 more 
people fell into the water.  20 PIW were recovered.  192 were accounted for.  However later when 
the  interpreter  was  talking  to  all  the  mig[rants],  one  person  said  that  3  people  were  “lost  during 
their  voyage.”    Not  sure  where  the  people  were  lost.    LPOK  Port  au  Paix,  Haiti,  on  19  Dec. 
[enroute  to]  Nassau.    All  mig[rants]  say  their  family  members  are  accounted  for.    Recommend 
using the OPBAT HELO coming back from GTMO can fly a VS just to do the prudent thing//FM 
OSR/SDO: RGR, Concur.  
 
At  1:50  p.m.,  the  helicopter  flying  from  Gitmo  back  to  Miami  was  asked  to  look  for 
people in  the water.  At 2:28  p.m.,  GANTSEC reported that “5 migrants are now saying that 3 
personnel,  by  name,  are  missing. …  All  were  seen  on  board  the  migrant  vsl  prior  to  the  cutter 
arrival.”  At 3:00 p.m., the cutter reported the following: 
 

FM [cutter] OPS:  We departed scene about 1 hour ago and as we left a group of 5 people said that 
3 were unaccounted for.  One of our coxswain saw 01 [migrant] sink and did not surface.  We are 
not  sure  how  many  [personal  flotation  devices]  were  distributed.    We  arrived  [on  site]  approx. 
0743  and  they  refused  life  jackets  originally  and  some  took  them  later.    Not  sure  who  though.  
There  were  25  –  30  people  in  the  water,  but  we  recovered  who  we  believe  is  everyone.    We 
departed because we as OSC felt 100% that the 02 mig[rants] sunk. 
 
In  response,  the  District  Command  Center  sent  a  message  saying,  “Stay  where  you  are 

and do not move until I brief the chain of command.”  The cutter acknowledged the message. 

 
At 3:05 p.m., a request was made for a helicopter to return to the area of the interdiction 
to search for PIWs.  At 3:28 p.m., District Search and Rescue sent a message stating, “We have 3 
unaccompanied so we would like to search some more.”  The District Command Center replied, 
“Concur.    Let’s  get  searching.”   At 3:50  p.m.,  GANTSET sent  a message saying, “Pass  to  [the 
cutter] to proceed back to last known position [of the migrant vessel].”  There is no evidence in 
the  Case  Report  that  the  cutter  received  this  message.    At  4:32  p.m.,  GANTSEC  reported  the 
following: 
 

FM GANTSEC: The reason the [cutter] is not [on site] is when we told them to turn around they 
did not and continued to the Winward//FM D7CC:  You tell them turn around now and proceed at 
best  speed.    We  have  a  helo  flying  a  search  area!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!    Find  out  what  their  ETA  is//FM 
GANTSEC:  Will have to call back. 

 
 
At 4:45 p.m., someone reported that “we passed approx. 1½ hours ago to GANTSEC to 
pass to [the cutter] to proceed back to LKP [last known position] and the OPBAT helo sees the 
[cutter]  but  heading  the  wrong  way.    We  passed  to  them  in  the  blind  to  proceed  back  to 
LKP.//FM OSR:  Write up an immediate msg fm OSR to the [cutter] with subject to remain [on 
site] until further advised and call me back to read it to me.”  At 4:49 p.m., GANTSEC reported 
that the cutter’s ETA at the last known position of the vessel was in two hours. 
 
 
At 5:00 p.m., the cutter reported that they had searched the site for four hours and that the 
information  about  2 people being unaccounted for came after they had departed the site, which 
they reported, but they had not communicated with Search and Rescue because “it was strictly [a 
law  enforcement]  case.”    The  OSR  replied,  “No  it  wasn’t  because  we  had  people in  the water.  
We are not exactly sure where the comms issue is but that’s neither here nor there.  You are to 

 

 

proceed  back  to  the  LKP.”    However, at  10:24  p.m.,  the following exchange occurred between 
the OSR and the cutter: 
 

FM  OSR:  Understand  your  full  story.    We  need  to  have  a  good  SAR  SITREP  that  documents 
everything  that  happened  and  the  issues  with  comms  and  any  other  pertinent  info.  //FM  CO 
[cutter]:  It will be sent as we speak.  Do you want us to return to the LKP? //FM OSR:  No, based 
on your full story, proceed back to the Windward. 

 
At  10:54  p.m.,  the  OSR  stated  that  all  of  their  communications  equipment  had  been 
 
checked  but  they  “still  couldn’t  talk  to  the  [cutter].”    He  concluded  that  the  communications 
problem must be with the cutter’s equipment.  At 11:11 p.m., the cutter stated that its equipment 
had been checked and was fine but they had had “bad comms w/ the 402 net and the footpattern 
is bad and we barely can get IMMARSAT connection and we have to change courses to even get 
a connection.” 
 
At 11:17 p.m., a message was sent concerning whether an investigation was needed, but 
 
the  command  stated  that  an  investigation  did  not  appear  to  be  necessary  because  “we  are  not 
responsible for the Haitians and we sound like we searched.” 
 
At  6:28  a.m.,  on  December  22,  2002,  the  cutter  reported  “comms  check  via  402  and 
 
INMARSAT.  No  joy.”    GANTSEC  sent  a  message  at  6:29  a.m.,  saying  “request  you  try  [the 
cutter]  and  see  if  they  sent  their  SITREP.    RGR.    Tried  comms.    No  joy.”    At  7:35,  the  cutter 
reported that they still could not communicate with INMARSAT or the 402. 
 
 
After the SITREP from the cutter was received, at 9:40 a.m., the OSR stated that “DCS 
agreed the [search and rescue] response was adequate and we could suspend case after [the heli-
copter]  searched.”    At  10:45  a.m.  the  District  Legal  Office  stated  that  they  needed  to  arrange 
“logistics for the CISD team, tech reps for comms gear (if needed), and the investigating officer.” 
 
 
On  December  23,  2002,  someone  reported  that  they  “have  lots  of  questions  about  the 
SITREP that [the cutter] sent out.  Need to get the info in their SITREP confirmed cause none of 
the voice reports we received match what was sent out in the SITREP.”  Someone replied that the 
District  was  going  to  convene  an  investigation.    Another  message  states  that  there  were  “some 
questions that the refugee section has on the [cutter’s] SITREP that need to be answered before 
we can move forward,” and that if the refugee section was not satisfied, someone would be sent 
down  to  interview  everyone.    The  cutter  replied  that  the  crew  knew  one  person  had  drowned 
because the coxswain and rescue swimmer had seen one person go under and not resurface.  In 
addition, the Operations Officer reported the following: 
 

[In reference to] your email of questions on mig[rants]:  1. 20 – 30 mig[rants] were on deck shout-
ing  at  same  time  and  interpreter  heard  someone  shout  that  they  would  rather  die  then  return  to 
Haiti.  But that was the only time that statement was overheard.  2. [In reference to] the interpre-
ter’s  comment  that  they  were  the  most  hostile  migrants  he  had  ever  seen,  he  said  that  [because] 
they were so loud and were shouting and waving their arms when CG first came upon them.  3. No 
statements have been made that they would rather die then return to Haiti since they’ve been w/ the 
Coast Guard.  Any issues they had with going back to Haiti were economically based.  4. No con-
cerns have been raised since they have been on board about going back to Haiti.  They are all ask-
ing to go back and be home by Christmas or in time to enroll their kids back in school.  5. They are 
not  hostile,  but  completely  compliant.  …  These  mig[rants]  are  not  unusual  and  definitely  do  not 
see an asylum issue here. 

 

 

  
At  3:33  p.m.  on  December  23,  2002,  FLAGPOT  noted  that  the  repatriation  had  been 
approved  for  the  next  day  at  Port  au  Prince.    In  addition,  someone  requested  “a  copy  of  the 
administrative investigation when it is completed.”  The cutter completed the repatriation of the 
migrants on December 24, 2002. 
 
 
The applicant submitted a copy of a press release about the migrant interdiction.  He also 
submitted a statement from his father, who stated that the applicant had sent him an email about 
the  migrant  interdiction  at  the  time  it  happened  noting  that  some  of  the refugees had drowned.  
The next time he heard from the applicant was on or about January 2, 2003, when the applicant 
sent him an email alleging that his CO had made changes to the log to try to cover up the deaths 
of the Haitian refugees.  He stated that if a member of the command saw the applicant’s email 
they  would  likely  consider  it  disloyal  and  insubordinate.    Then  on  January  8,  2003,  a  junior 
officer advised him that the applicant had been punished at mast and removed from the cutter. 
 
Allegations about the Investigation of the Charges Against the Applicant 
 

The  applicant  alleged  that  the  commanding  officer  (CO)  of  the  cutter  appointed  a  pre-
liminary  investigating  officer,  who  conducted  a  pre-disciplinary  investigation  of  the  charges 
against him in  accordance with  the Military Justice Manual, although the Coast Guard called it 
an  administrative  investigation  as  if  it  had  been  conducted  under  the  Administrative  Investiga-
tions  Manual.    He  alleged  that,  as  a  pre-disciplinary  investigation,  the  investigating  officer’s 
report  was  “an  integral  part  of  the  NJP  proceedings  against  [him],  which  were  ordered  to  be 
removed from his record by [the Area Commander].”  

 
The applicant alleged that many of the statements obtained during the investigation were 
made by “enlisted people, junior to and far less sophisticated than [him].”  These enlisted mem-
bers made erroneous allegations that he had been involved in an inappropriate relationship with 
LTJG X in violation of Article 8.H. of the Personnel Manual.  Therefore, he argued, their “erro-
neous  allegations  taint  the  content  of  the  witness  statements.”    The  applicant  stated  that  their 
allegations  were  erroneous  because  LTJG  X  was  a  friend  of  equal  rank,  they  did  not  have  a 
romantic relationship, and they were not in each other’s chain of command. 
 

Moreover, the applicant alleged that at some point after he was charged, the CO illegally 
confined him to his stateroom, deprived him of access to a telephone or email, and ordered him 
not  to  communicate with  anyone except  senior officers about the charges against him.  He was 
also  “ordered to have no communications with anyone off the ship, about anything.”   He could 
talk  only  to  personnel  sent  by  the  CO  and  was  not  allowed  to  contact  counsel.    Although  he 
repeatedly asked to speak to counsel, he was repeatedly and illegally questioned by senior offic-
ers on the cutter, and he was threatened with additional charges if he did not sign a false state-
ment  confessing  to  the  alleged  offenses.    He  submitted  copies  of  the  Rules  for  Courts-Martial 
concerning pre-trial restraint and pre-trial confinement and alleged that his pre-trial confinement 
was  illegal  because  it  was  not  imposed  by  a  hearing  officer.  Therefore,  he  concluded,  his  con-
finement constituted unlawful detention. 
 

The  applicant  stated  that  he  was  not  released  from  confinement  until  January  7,  2003, 
when the CO took him to  mast  but  denied him legal  assistance or representation as well as the 

 

 

right  to  speak  and  to  present  evidence  and  witnesses  in  his  own  defense  or  in  mitigation  or 
extenuation.    The  CO  imposed  NJP  under  Article  15  of  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice 
(UCMJ),  including  thirty  days  of  restriction  to  be  served  at  the  nearby  Coast  Guard  Academy. 
The CO failed to inform him of his right to appeal, and when the applicant asked about a right to 
appeal, the CO threatened him with additional punishment if he exercised that right.  The appli-
cant alleged that the CO also forced him to sign an illegal document waiving his right to appeal 
the  NJP.    Immediately  after the mast, the CO had the applicant  removed from  the cutter  to  the 
Academy by helicopter, which the CO had arranged in advance of the mast since the cutter was 
underway.  While in restriction at the Academy, the applicant alleged, the Superintendent of the 
Academy continued to deny him access to a telephone or email, so he could not contact his fam-
ily or an attorney. 
 
 
The applicant stated that after his father, a retired Coast Guard captain, heard about what 
was  happening  through  a  third  party,  his  father  threatened  the  officer  who  ultimately  served  as 
the Reviewer for the first  disputed OER with legal action and was allowed to telephone him at 
the Academy.  When his father telephoned him on January 8, 2003, the applicant learned about 
his right to appeal the NJP, and he did so on January 27, 2003, without the assistance of counsel.  
When  the  CO  received  the  appeal,  he  called  the  applicant  and  again  threatened  him with addi-
tional punishment if he did not withdraw the appeal.  The CO “tried to leverage a retraction from 
[the applicant] by threatening to write an inaccurate and derogatory OER that was due on his per-
formance aboard the vessel.”   
 

On  February  2,  2003,  the  applicant  submitted  a  request  for  his  punishment  to  be  sus-
pended, but the CO denied the request even though the law requires such requests to be approved 
if an NJP appeal is not adjudicated within five days of filing.  Therefore, the applicant remained 
unlawfully  incarcerated  at  the  Academy  for  thirty  days.    In  fact,  he  was  incarcerated for thirty-
three  days  because  the  CO  failed  to  include  transit  time  in  the  calculation  of  his  thirty-day 
sentence, as required by the Military Justice Manual.  On March 24, 2003, the Area Commander, 
a vice admiral, nullified the NJP, “rescinded the punishment, ordered all trace of the proceedings 
to be removed from [his] record, and verbally reprimanded the CO.”6   
 
 
The applicant submitted a copy of his NJP appeal dated January 27, 2003, in support of 
these allegations.7  In his appeal, he stated that he was not allowed to have a mast representative 
even though he requested one and he was not allowed to seek advice or counsel.  When the XO 
told him on January 4, 2003, that he had been placed on report for violations of the UCMJ, the 
XO  also  said  that  he  did  not  think  a  mast  representative  would  be  available  because  everyone 
senior to the applicant on the cutter was otherwise involved in the case.  The applicant told the 
XO  that  he  wanted  a  mast  representative,  and  the  XO  said  they  would  name  someone  later.  
However, no one was appointed before the mast on January 7, 2003, and when the CO asked him 
if he had a representative, the applicant responded that he wanted one but no one was available.  
The CO conducted the mast anyway.   
 

                                                 
6 The Area Commander’s March 24, 2003, memorandum nullifying the NJP was removed from his record pursuant 
to the final decision in BCMR Docket No. 2007-160 because it mentioned his NJP. 
7  The  applicant’s  NJP  appeal  was  not  in  the  record  before  the  Board  in  the  original  case  because  it  was  removed 
from his record pursuant to the Area Commander’s March 24, 2003, memorandum. 

 

 

Moreover, the applicant alleged in his NJP appeal, that he had been held in pre-trial con-
 
finement  for  three  days  without  the  approval  of  a  military  judge  or  hearing  officer.    He  was 
working with LTJG P, when the Operations Officer told her to tell him that he was to remain in 
his  stateroom at all times except to retrieve his meals.  His ability to communicate with people 
not on the cutter was ended because his SWSIII account was suspended. 
 
 
The applicant alleged in his NJP appeal that the statement he gave the investigator “was 
obtained  through  use  of  mental  coercion  and  the  threat  of  far  worse  punishment  than  could  be 
imposed  at  captain’s  mast.”    He  stated  that  during  his  first  interview  with  the  investigator,  he 
chose not to incriminate himself.  However, three hours later, he spoke with LTJG P in his state-
room, and she said that the Operations Officer told her that LTJG X “was planning on writing in 
her statement that she had blacked out and would claim that I had raped her on the night in ques-
tion” and that “unless I came forward and could prove that I did not rape [LTJG X] that I would 
most likely be tried at a Courts Martial, and could be faced with a sentence in Federal Prison.”  
LTJG P told him that these steps were being taken and that he needed to prove immediately that 
he had not raped LTJG X.  Therefore, he went to the investigator and volunteered more informa-
tion to try to show that he had not raped LTJG X.  However, the night before the mast, he was 
shown  the  statements  gathered  by  the  investigator,  including  LTJG  X’s  statement,  and  he 
realized he had been deceived by the command.  Therefore, he decided to admit to all charges at 
the mast to try to keep the proceedings as short as possible. 
 
 
The applicant further alleged in his NJP appeal that he was not allowed to introduce mat-
ters in extenuation or mitigation at the mast.  He stated that had he been allowed to present such 
evidence, he would have told the CO that he had broken up with his fiancé the night before the 
alleged offenses because of her infidelity and that he had been depressed.  He further alleged that 
after the mast, he was required to sign a document waiving his right to representation at mast. 
 

The  applicant  also  alleged  in  his  NJP  appeal  that  the  charges  against  him  had  not  been 
proved.    He  stated  that  everyone,  even  the  command,  had  acknowledged  that  when  he  kissed 
LTJG X in the Tiki Bar it was not romantic but just a humorous stunt to raise morale.  He denied 
ever having been counseled about a perception of an inappropriate relationship and alleged that 
the  Operations  Officer  merely  told  him  “my  policy  is  and  I  realize  that  this  is  not  in  line  with 
Commandant  is  to  simply  keep  it  off  the  ship.”    He  stated  that  he  had  slept  in  the  same  hotel 
room with LTJG X only because he had lost the key to his own room.  Moreover, he and LTJG X 
“did  not  believe  the  perception  would  be  negative  given  the  circumstances of the situation and 
the few people present.”  He alleged that the rules had not been applied fairly because LTJG P 
had not been charged even though she spent the night in another hotel room with two male petty 
officers.   

 

Allegations about the Page 7 

 
On April 11, 2003, the CO of the cutter, which was still the applicant’s permanent duty 
station,  referred  him  to  a  Naval  hospital for alcohol dependence screening.  Hospital  personnel 
determined  that  he  was  not  alcohol  dependent  and  sent  the  CO  a  letter  admonishing  him  for 
wasting  their  time.  The applicant  stated that  because the screening referral  is  in  his  record but 
the hospital’s response is not, his record falsely indicates that he had an alcohol problem, which 

 

 

is false.  Therefore, he argued, either the referral should be removed from his record or the hos-
pital’s reply should be added to his record. 

 

Allegations about the Disputed OERs  
 
 
After his release from confinement, the applicant was assigned to the Academy on a tem-
porary  basis  as  a  Planning  Officer.    Within  days  of his  release, he learned that his  rating chain 
aboard  the  cutter—which included the Operations Officer, the Executive Officer (XO), and the 
CO—was preparing a derogatory OER for him and he was given a draft copy of it, which he sent 
to his father.  He wanted his OER to be prepared by the officers who were supervising him at the 
Academy.  Therefore, on April 9, 2003, he asked that his rating chain be disqualified so that his 
OER for the evaluation period October 1, 2002, through January 31, 2003, would be prepared by 
other officers.8  The applicant alleged that although his request was granted, his substitute rating 
chain  prepared  a  derogatory  OER  based  on  information  that  the  Area  Commander  had  already 
ordered  stricken  from  his  record.    The  applicant  alleged  that  the  substitute  rating  chain  should 
have  marked  all  of  the  performance  categories  on  the  first  disputed  OER  as  “not  observed” 
because none of them observed his actual performance.  Instead, they created a derogatory OER 
based on information from the biased rating chain and from the NJP documents.  The applicant 
alleged  that  he  learned  that  the  members  of  the  substitute  rating  chain  were close associates of 
the  CO  of  the  cutter  and  “may  have  been  involved  in  the  effort  to  suppress  information 
concerning the [migrant interdiction] incident.”  The applicant alleged that the Reporting Officer 
and  Reviewer  who  prepared  the  first  disputed OER were biased against him because his  father 
had  threatened  the  Reviewer  with  legal  action  and  had  reported  both  officers  to  Headquarters 
officials  in  2001  for  “manipulating  Atlantic  Area  Cutter  Performance  Records  to  show  better 
performance  than  actual.”    However,  the  Area  Command  refused  to  remove  the  derogatory 
information  from  the  first  disputed  OER,  and  the  Coast  Guard  Personnel  Command  (CGPC) 
refused to allow him to submit an effective Reply to the OER.  He stated that upon receipt of the 
first  disputed  OER,  he  submitted  an  OER  Reply  to  respond  to  the  OER.    However,  CGPC 
rejected it  because of its content and he was required to  revise it twice and was not allowed to 
address the most important issues in his Reply. 
 
 
Regarding the second disputed OER, the applicant stated that it was simply an attempt by 
the substitute rating chain to insert negative information in his record.  The applicant stated that 
throughout the evaluation period from February 1 to July 13, 2003, he never worked aboard the 
cutter.  He stated that because his performance during that period is adequately described on the 
concurrent OER prepared by his chain of command at his temporary duty station, the second dis-
puted OER “serves no useful purpose and should be removed.”   
 
Allegations about the Proposed Revocation Board 
 
The  applicant  stated  that  even  though  the  Area  Commander  overturned  his  NJP  and 
 
ordered its removal from  his  records,  CGPC  added insult  to  injury by threatening to  convene a 
panel of senior officers under Article 12.A.11. of the Personnel Manual (hereinafter “Revocation 

                                                 
8  The  applicant’s  memorandum  requesting  disqualification  of  his  rating  chain  and  the  Area  Commander’s  memo-
randum disqualifying his rating chain were removed from his record pursuant to the final decision in BCMR Docket 
No. 2007-160 because they mentioned his NJP. 

 

 

Board”) to determine whether his commission should be revoked.  The applicant was informed 
that  he  would not  be granted a hearing or allowed to question his  accusers.  He would only be 
allowed to submit a written statement on his own behalf.   
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  CGPC’s  threat  to  convene  a  Revocation  Board  on  May  25, 
2004, was illegal and coercive because the Coast Guard could not legitimately have held a Revo-
cation Board on that date since he had more than three years of commissioned service.  His third 
anniversary  in  commissioned  service  was  May  8,  2004.    The  applicant  alleged  that  up  until 
March  8,  2005,  the  Personnel  Manual  authorized  Revocation  Boards  only  during  officers’  first 
three years of service, after which they were entitled to “show cause” boards, the procedures for 
which include a hearing for the officer and the right to present evidence and examine witnesses.  
The  applicant  noted  that  the  BCMR  quoted  the  version  of  Article  12.A.11.  with  the  three-year 
limitation in its original decision in his case.  However, he alleged, when he was notified of the 
pending  Revocation  Board,  he  was  sent  a  copy  of  the  rules—Article  12.A.11.  of  the Personnel 
Manual—with  “pen  and  ink”  changes  purporting  to  extend  the  period  for  holding  such  boards 
from three years to five.  The applicant alleged that the “attempted alteration was a violation of 
the Coast Guard’s own regulations” and noted that the Coast Guard was legally bound to adhere 
to its own regulations. 
 
 
The applicant stated that under section 8.A.3. of COMDTINST M5215.5E, which was in 
effect  on  May  25,  2004,  pen  and  ink  changes  to  the  Personnel  Manual  and  other  Coast  Guard 
directives had been abolished.  Previously, under COMDTINST M5215.5D, pen and ink changes 
were  allowed  only if the changes were minor.  The applicant  argued that lengthening the juris-
dictional  period  for  Revocation  Boards  from  three  years  to  five  cannot  be  considered  minor.  
Therefore,  because  the  five-year  amendment  did  not  become  effective  until  Change  39  of  the 
Personnel Manual went into effect in 2005, the Coast Guard could not have legally held a Revo-
cation Board for him on May 25, 2004.  Because of the illegality of the threat to hold a Revoca-
tion Board, the applicant argued, the BCMR should nullify all of the actions and consequences of 
that threat.  He argued that the illegal threat constituted fraud, which induced him to request res-
ignation  and  deprived  him  of  his  rights  and  privileges  as  an  officer.  He  stated  that  if  he  had 
known he was entitled to a show cause board, where he could present evidence and examine the 
witnesses, he would not have resigned. 
 

Moreover,  the  applicant  alleged,  when  he  was  provided  a  copy  of  the  documents  to  be 
considered  by  the  Revocation  Board,  he  discovered  that  the report of investigation  was wrong-
fully included even though the Area Commander had already ordered the documentation of the 
NJP to be removed from his record.  Although he asked for the report to be removed from con-
sideration  by  the  Revocation  Board,  CGPC  refused  to  do  so,  thereby  violating  his  right  to  due 
process.    The  applicant  argued  that  the  reporting  of  the  investigation  was  part  of the mast pro-
ceedings and so the report  should not  have been among the documents to be considered by the 
Revocation  Board.    He  argued  that  under  COMDTINST  1410.2  only  witnesses’  statements 
gathered during criminal, civil, or administrative investigations or those conducted by the Coast 
Guard  Investigative  Service  may  be  shown  to  a  Revocation  Board.    Therefore,  he  alleged, 
because his command conducted a pre-disciplinary investigation under the Military Justice Man-
ual  that  resulted  in  NJP,  the  witnesses’  statements  could  not  legally  have  been  shown  to  a 
Revocation  Board  since  they  were  “obtained  during  a  pre-NJP  investigation.”    He  also  alleged 

 

 

that  COMDTINST  1410.2  “excludes  the  Investigating  Officer’s  statements,  opinions,  recom-
mendations, and conclusions.”   

 
Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the witnesses’ statements were not part of his per-
sonnel  record,  and  the  Personnel  Manual  allows  only  an  officer’s  record  to  be  considered  by  a 
Revocation Board.  He noted that on the letter forwarding him the documents to be reviewed by 
the board, his  Headquarters Personal Data Record (PDR) is  listed separately from  the report of 
the investigation and that Coast Guard’s regulations prohibit filing such a report in a member’s 
PDR.  Therefore, he argued, the report of the investigation was not a proper part of his record and 
should not have been included for consideration by the Revocation Board.  The applicant further 
argued that the report was part of the mast proceedings and so should have been removed from 
his  record  as  documentation  of  the  mast  pursuant  to  the  Area  Commander’s  order.    He  also 
argued that it was completely unjust for CGPC to include the report of the investigation or parts 
thereof  in  the  record  before  the  Revocation  Board  without  also  including  the  fact  that  his  NJP 
had been overturned due to insufficient evidence. 
 

The applicant stated that when CGPC illegally refused to remove the report of the inves-
tigation from the documents to be considered by the Revocation Board, he realized that the out-
come  of  the  board  was  a  “foregone  conclusion.”    He  noted  that  LTJG  X,  with  whom  he  was 
wrongly accused of having an inappropriate relationship, ultimately had her commission revoked 
pursuant to a Revocation Board, and therefore concluded that his assumption about the outcome 
was  correct.    In  addition,  he  realized  that  the  board’s  proceedings  would  become  a  part  of  his 
record  and  therefore  reintroduce  into  his  record  the  negative  information  that  the  Area  Com-
mander had ordered removed, which might adversely affect his ability to obtain highly skilled or 
clearance-sensitive  employment.    Therefore,  the  Coast  Guard’s  illegal  actions coerced him into 
resigning  his  commission,  which  was  the  only  way  he  could  avoid  the  reintroduction  of  false, 
negative information into his record via the proceedings of the Revocation Board.  

 
The  applicant  submitted  a  document  titled  “Draft  Submission  to  Revocation  Board,”  in 
which he asked the Revocation Board to disregard the first disputed OER, alleging that the state-
ments  therein  are  false,  that  he  never  received  formal  counseling  about  the  first  incident  at  the 
Tiki Bar, that statements that he had wanted to include in his OER Reply had been censored, and 
that he had never been counseled about misusing alcohol.  In addition, he asked the Revocation 
Board to refuse to review the witnesses’ statements because they were not entered in his Personal 
Data Record (PDR).  He alleged that his  own statement had been coerced with a threat of rape 
and pointed out that many of the statements are not from people who witnessed what happened at 
the hotel. 
 
Allegations about the DD 214 
 
Regarding  the  separation  code  and  narrative  reason  for  separation  on  his  DD  214,  the 
 
applicant stated that they were based on the erroneous information in the first disputed OER.  His 
other OERs are excellent.  Therefore, he alleged, the notation “Substandard Performance” is erro-
neous.  The applicant also alleged that the DD 214 was based on an inaccurate database entry by 
CGPC.    He  submitted  a  “Case  Status”  printout  from  a  database  concerning  CGPC’s  special 
boards.    The  printout,  dated  May  20,  2004,  shows  as  the  status  of  the  case  that  the  applicant’s 
resignation had been approved in lieu of board action.  However, the database entry concerning 

 

 

the issue that would have been before the Revocation Board is described as “8-H [which means 
inappropriate  relationship]  with  [LTJG  X]  at  [name  of  applicant’s  last  duty  station].”    He  sub-
mitted an affidavit  from  the CO of his  last  unit attesting to  the fact  that the applicant “was not 
involved in any 8-H incident [inappropriate relationship], while under my command.”  Moreover, 
he argued that he was never accused of an 8-H offense.  The applicant alleged that this erroneous 
entry made it falsely appear as if he had engaged in two separate 8-H incidents and that he was 
discharged  for  substandard  performance  because  of  an  erroneous  perception  that  he  had  been 
involved in two 8-H incidents.  The applicant further alleged that the DD 214 is unjust because it 
has caused him to be denied employment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
 
Regarding  the  DD  215  issued  on August  22, 2006, the applicant  alleged that it changes 
the authority for discharge in block 25 of his DD 214 from one erroneous citation to the Person-
nel  Manual  (Article 12-1-15, which does not exist) to another erroneous citation (Article 12-B-
15, which authorizes disability discharges for enlisted members).  Therefore, he argued, the DD 
215 must be removed from his record. 
 
Allegations about the DRB Testimony, Recommendation, and Decision 
 
Finally,  the  applicant  alleged  that  although  the  Discharge  Review  Board  (DRB)  found 
 
that the Coast Guard had committed serious errors resulting in great injustice to him and recom-
mended  the  rescission  of  his  resignation  and  restoration  of  his  commission,  the  Commandant 
disapproved the DRB’s recommendation without explanation.   
 

The  applicant  alleged  that  during  his  DRB  hearing,  he  and  his  father,  who  represented 
him, persuasively argued that his command was biased against him and looking for a reason to 
get of him after he sent his father the email about the cutter leaving the area where migrants had 
fallen off a boat.  The applicant alleged that he also argued at the hearing that his receipt of one 
poor  OER,  written  by  officers  who  never  observed  his  performance  and  got  their  information 
from biased sources, was not an adequate basis for CGPC to threaten to revoke his commission 
and  that  CGPC  had  acted  arbitrarily  and  capriciously  in  initiating  the  board.    In  addition,  the 
applicant  stated that  his  relationship  with  the  LTJG X was not  romantic and that even if it had 
been romantic, it would not have been an “inappropriate relationship” under Article 8.H. because 
they  were  both  officers  and  they  were  of the same rank, seniority, and level  within the cutter’s 
command structure.  He stated that if the CO had considered it an “unauthorized relationship,” he 
need only have transferred one or both of them without prejudice.   The applicant told the DRB 
that during his pre-mast confinement, the command took away his cell phone and terminated his 
email privilege.  The XO told him that if he admitted to one count of violating Article 92 of the 
UCMJ, he was get light punishment, such as a non-punitive letter.  At the mast, he and LTJG X 
were not allowed to speak in their own defense, and the CO refused to conduct the extenuation 
and  mitigation  phase  because  a  helicopter  that  the  CO  has  previously  ordered  to  take  them  to 
confinement at the Academy had already arrived.  Yet the CO gave them the maximum punish-
ment.  Instead of informing them of their right to appeal, the CO “warned us that if we tried to 
appeal, it would not be approved and we would only get more punishment.”  The applicant fur-
ther  alleged  that  he told the DRB that the many mistakes the CO made in  conducting the mast 
should  be  considered  signs  of  bias  because  the  CO  was  an  experienced  captain/O-6  who  must 
have known how to conduct a mast properly but may have thought he was untouchable and could 

 

 

get away with anything because his own chain of command had reason to dislike the applicant’s 
father. 

 
The applicant  also  told the DRB that after his appeal was upheld, the Area Commander 
was “furious” with the CO and “gave him a major league dressing down.”  The CO relieved the 
XO and the OPS, who left the ship, and the CO himself was relieved of command shortly there-
after.  The applicant’s father testified to the DRB that the officers who served on the applicant’s 
substitute rating chain may also have been criticized because they presumably approved the mast.  
The father stated that these officers had good reason to dislike him and that when they saw that 
his  son might  get  NJP, “their desire for some form  of revenge overcame their common sense.”  
He noted that the Area Commander also overturned LTJG X’s NJP and she did not even file an 
appeal.  Yet in planning the Revocation Board, CGPC intended to show the board the NJP pack-
age without his appeal or the Area Commander’s letter overturning the NJP. 

 
Finally, the applicant stated that the DRB did not review the witnesses’ statements from 
the investigation or accept them into evidence.  He argued that under the Commandant’s eviden-
tiary standard in COMDTINST 1410.2, the BCMR should also reject the witnesses’ statements. 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 

On  May  8,  2001,  the  applicant  was  commissioned  an  ensign  upon  graduating  from  the 
Coast Guard Academy.  Thereafter, he was assigned to a cutter as a deck watch officer.  On his 
first OER, for the period May 21, 2001, to March 31, 2002, he received primarily marks of 4 (on 
a  scale  of  1  to  7,  with  7  being  best)  in  the  various  performance  categories  and  a  mark  in  the 
fourth spot on the comparison scale, denoting him as “one of the many competent professionals 
who form the majority of this grade.”  The XO of the cutter, who served as the Reporting Officer 
for the OER, noted that the applicant was “on track” for promotion with his peers.  On his second 
OER, for the period April 1, 2002, to September 30, 2002, the applicant received marks of 4 and 
5 in  the various performance categories and a mark in the fourth spot on the comparison scale.  
The Reporting Officer again recommended him for promotion.   The applicant was promoted to 
lieutenant junior grade on November 23, 2002.  
 
Report of the Investigating Officer9 
 
 
 The  record  indicates  that  in  late  December  2002  or  early  January  2003,  the  CO  of  the 
cutter appointed a lieutenant commander who was not a member of the applicant’s rating chain to 
conduct an investigation of allegations that the applicant and a female LTJG were involved in an 
unacceptable relationship.  The CO’s letter and the written findings and recommendations of the 
investigating officer (IO) are not in the record before the Board, but CGPC submitted copies of 
many statements gathered by the IO and attached to his report with the advisory opinion.   
 

The IO’s attachments show that on January 3, 2003, he informed the applicant in writing 
that he was suspected of violating Article 92 of the UCMJ twice (failure to obey an order or reg-
ulation)  and  Article  133  (conduct  unbecoming  an  officer  and  gentleman).    On  the  written 
acknowledgement of his rights, the applicant acknowledged the right to remain silent and not to 

                                                 
9 The documents summarized in this section were submitted by CGPC as attachments to the advisory opinion. 

 

 

answer questions; the right to consult with a lawyer before deciding whether to answer questions 
or  make  a  statement;  and  the  right  to  stop  answering  questions  at  any  time.    He  also  acknowl-
edged  that  any  statement  he  made  could  be  used  against  him  in  any  court-martial,  NJP,  or 
administrative proceeding.  The applicant checked boxes on this form indicating that he did not 
desire to  consult  a lawyer but did desire to make a statement and to answer the IO’s questions.  
LTJG  X, who was  also  accused, signed the same acknowledgement and also indicated that she 
did  not  desire  to  consult  a  lawyer  but  desired  to  make  a  statement  and  answer  questions.    The 
applicant ultimately signed four statements for the IO: 

 
1. 

On  January  5,  2003,  the  applicant  signed  and  submitted  a  statement  for  the 
investigation  “to  give  amplifying  information  to  the  questions  answered  for  [the  IO] on 3 JAN 
03.”    His  statement  began  with  the  following  claim:  “With  full  understanding  of  my  rights,  I 
make  the  following  statement  freely,  voluntarily,  and  without  any  promises  or  threats  made  to 
me.”  He claimed that he had been friends with LTJG X for five years, “since being in the same 
company  together  at  the  Academy”  and  he  had  grown  very  close  to  her  while  stationed  on  the 
cutter.  However, their kiss at the Tiki Bar had “caught [him] completely off guard.”  He admit-
ted that he relished her attention and began “not to care how other people looked at it, and … to 
pay more attention to her as well,” even though he “realized the perception was negative.” 
 

2. 

On January 6, 2003, after answering more questions posed by the IO, the applicant 
signed  the  IO’s  summary  of  his  answers  as  “true  and  accurate.”    He  admitted  to  having  kissed 
LTJG  X  and  LTJG  P  at  the  Tiki  Bar  on  December  18,  2002,  in  the  presence  of  many  people, 
including several petty officers.  He admitted to drinking shots of tequila and becoming ill due to 
his alcohol consumption.  The next day, his Supervisor, LT L, who was the Operations Officer, 
counseled him about the improper perceptions of their conduct.  LT L told him that although the 
kissing  may  have  been  done  in  jest,  it  was  the  perception  that  mattered,  and  that  a  rumor  had 
started.  LT L told him that he did not care as long as it stayed off the boat.  The applicant also 
told the IO that on December 28, 2002, they rented a three-bedroom hotel suite.  He and LTJG C 
were to share one bedroom, LTJG X and LTJG P the second bedroom, and the BMC and BM1 
the third bedroom.  When the applicant and LTJG X returned to the hotel after the wetting down 
party, he could not find the key for his own room and LTJG C was not there.  They found LTJG 
P asleep in the petty officers’ room and tried to wake her but were unsuccessful.  The applicant 
and LTJG X went to LTJG X’s room, chatted for a while, and then slept in the single beds that 
were already arranged pushed together.  The applicant had lost his shirt at the party but otherwise 
did not disrobe.  The applicant told the IO that he did not have sex with LTJG X and has never 
had sex with her aboard the cutter.  He knew she was married and denied having a romantic rela-
tionship with her.   
 
 
Three hours later, the applicant went to the IO’s stateroom and said he thought he 
could  save LTJG X’s marriage but  that, after learning what  LTJG P had related, he “needed to 
come clean morally and professionally.”  Although LTJG P and LTJG X had been ordered not to 
discuss any issue in the case with the applicant, LTJG P had told him to “tell the truth and do the 
right thing.”  The applicant then told the IO that he and LTJG X had done “everything other than 
vaginal  intercourse,”  including  oral  sex.    He  signed  this  addendum  to  his  prior  statements  on 
January 6, 2003, and agreed to sign a fourth, more formal statement.   
 

3. 

 

 

4. 

On January 6, 2003, the applicant signed a fourth statement for the IO, beginning 
with the following: “With full understanding of my rights, I make the following statement freely, 
voluntarily,  and  without  any  promises  or  threats  made to  me.”  He stated that  after the wetting 
down  party,  he  and  LTJG  X  found  LTJG  P  asleep  in  the  petty  officers’  room.    She  went  with 
them to her and LTJG X’s room but later insisted on going back to the petty officers’ room for 
the night.  Since he could not find the key to his own room, he “opted to stay with” LTJG X in 
her room.  They kissed and “performed oral sex on each other.” 

 
LTGJ L admitted to the IO that she kissed the applicant in front of several petty officers 
after they drank shots of tequila at the Tiki Bar on December 18, 2002.  The applicant got sick, 
vomited,  and  had  to  be  helped  back  to  his  rack.    The  next  day,  LT  L  counseled  her  about  her 
inappropriate conduct  and the problem of perception.  LT L said  that  they could be together as 
long as they were in a group with other junior officers or petty officers.  Then on December 28, 
2002, they rented a hotel “villa,” including a “main house” with one main bedroom with a lock 
and  two  other,  separate  bedrooms  with  locks.    She  and  the  applicant  were  the  last  to  leave  the 
wetting down party and had been drinking most of the evening.  At the villa, they found LTJG P 
asleep in the petty officers’ bedroom, woke her, and told her to come to her own room, but LTJG 
P  would  not  leave.   Because the applicant  could  not  find the key to  his  room,  they slept in  the 
adjoining  beds  in  her  room.    She  wore  pajamas  and  the  applicant  wore  gym  shorts.    LTJG  X 
stated that their relationship was “purely platonic” and denied ever having had oral or vaginal sex 
with him.  She also stated that she had never held hands with the applicant but that he sometimes 
covered her hands with his to make her stop picking at her nails.  She recalled that he did this on 
December 29, 2002, as they returned to the cutter in the van. 

 
LT L, the Operations Officer of the cutter and the applicant’s supervisor, told the IO that 
he counseled the applicant after hearing that he and LTJG X had kissed in a bar in front of many 
crewmates, some of whom believed they were involved in an inappropriate relationship.  Since 
the  applicant  and  LTJG  X  were  both  in  other  long-term  relationships,  he  thought  they  were 
merely friends who had drunk too much alcohol and behaved improperly.  He told the applicant 
about the crew’s perception of impropriety and about how they could remain friends without cre-
ating  the  perception  of  an  inappropriate  relationship.    LT  L  stated  that  had  seen  them  holding 
hands once before when the applicant got drunk and LTJG X helped him back to the cutter.  On 
that occasion, he had told them it was not a good idea to behave like that before him.   

 
LTJG P  told the IO  that at  the Tiki Bar on December 18, 2002,  she and  LTJG X drank 
shots of tequila and kissed each other.  After they drank more shots, LTJG X grabbed the appli-
cant  by the ears and kissed him.  Later, the applicant got ill and vomited twice.   Regarding the 
incident on December 28, 2002, LTJG P stated that she left the party with the BMC and BM1 to 
show  them  the  way  to  the  villa.    She  waited  in  the  petty  officers’  room  for  LTJG  X  to  return 
because she did not have the key to the room she was sharing with LTJG X.  The applicant and 
LTJG X arrived shortly thereafter, and the three of them went to the women’s bedroom.  As she 
prepared for bed, the applicant and LTJG X went out onto the balcony and LTJG X put her head 
on the applicant’s shoulder.  LTJG P “did not feel right” so she went back to the petty officers’ 
room.  The applicant and LTJG X came looking for her, but she told them that she did not want 
to go back to her own room with them.  They left and she fell asleep in the petty officers’ room.  
Early  the  next  morning,  LTJG  X  let  her  into  their  room  when  she  knocked.    LTJG  X  and  the 
applicant were both in pajamas.  LTJG P took a shower and was getting ready to leave when the 

 

 

BMC walked “through the house to see the layout that was in it.  As he walked thru the kitchen, 
towards the bedroom, he noticed [the applicant and LTJG X] lying in bed.  He decided not to go 
any further.”  Later, LTJG P saw the applicant and LTJG X holding hands together in the van. 

 
BMC  M  told  the  IO  that  at  the  wetting  down  party,  the  applicant  and  LTJG  X  danced 
close together for most of the evening.  BMC M stated that he is “not entirely sure why [LTJG P] 
stayed in the room he shared with the BM1 but “can only speculate that she felt a little uncom-
fortable  given  the  obvious  ‘couple  nature’  of  the  two;  ‘a  third  wheel.’”    The  next  morning,  he 
walked around the villa with LTJG P and heard her speaking with the applicant and LTJG X.  As 
he walked toward their bedroom, he saw a woman’s undergarment or bathing suit bottom on the 
floor and so decided to leave.  On his way back to his room, he noticed that no one had used the 
bedroom that the applicant and LTJG C were supposed to share because the beds were still made. 

 
BM1 B told the IO that he saw LTJG X kiss the applicant at the Tiki Bar when they were 
all “impaired.”  After the party on December 28, 2002, he walked to the hotel with LTJG P and 
BMC M.  LTJG P had the key to one of the three bedrooms so they waited there for the others.  
All  three  of  them  “racked  out  and  attempted  to  get  some  sleep.”    He  recalled  speaking  to  the 
applicant and LTJG X when they returned to the hotel but did not see them the next morning. 

 
LTJG C told the IO that he did not witness the kiss in the Tiki Bar but found LTJG X sit-

ting on the edge of the applicant’s rack later that night when the applicant was lying in the rack.  
On  the  night  of  the  wetting  down  party,  he  left  the  party and  went  to  a club.   Later,  instead of 
going to the hotel room he was supposed to share with the applicant, he went back to his rack on 
the cutter because it was closer.  He never saw the hotel villa.   

 
The IO also gathered signed statements from several other crewmembers and one contrac-
tor serving aboard the cutter.  Some had witnessed or heard about the kissing incident at the Tiki 
Bar; some reported having seen the applicant  and  LTJG X holding hands, dancing closely, and 
acting like a couple; and some had heard that they had shared a hotel room.  Other crewmembers 
told the IO that they did not observe any inappropriate behavior between the applicant and LTJG 
X but had heard rumors of such. 

 

Non-Judicial Punishment 

 
On January 7, 2003, the applicant was taken to mast and awarded NJP by his CO, which 
included restriction for 30 days and a letter of reprimand.  The Court Memorandum that would 
have documented the mast and the letter of reprimand that he was awarded at mast are not in his 
record  because  his  appeal  of the NJP was approved by the Area Commander.  The Area Com-
mander’s letter dated March 24, 2003,  upholding the appeal and overturning the NJP states the 
following in pertinent part (the full text of letter was received from CGPC with the advisory opi-
nion after the applicant submitted a copy of it with his original application but redacted the parts 
that are shaded below): 

 
1.  … Your appeal is granted and the punishment accordingly overturned. … 
3.  On January 7, 2003, the Commanding Officer of the USCGC … conducted Captain’s Mast and 
found that you violated UCMJ Article 92 (two counts),  Article 125, Article 133 and Article 134.  
Your commanding officer awarded a written reprimand and restriction to the Coast Guard Acad-
emy for 30 days.  In your appeal, you assert that you were:  denied a representative, coerced into 

 

 

making a statement, not permitted to offer matters in extenuation or mitigation, and placed in con-
finement prior to mast.  You also claim that the elements of Articles 92 (both counts), 133 and 134 
were not met, and that the elements of Article 125 were not explained to you. 
4.  After a thorough review of the record, I find that there is insufficient evidence to establish the 
reported  misconduct  for  both  the  orders  violations  under  Article  92  and  the  adultery  charge  in 
Article 134.  Therefore, I am dismissing those charges.  
5.    I  am  convinced  from  the  record  before  me  that  you  committed  the  misconduct  as  charged  in 
Article 133 and Article 125.  However, I am deeply concerned about the way this matter was han-
dled by your command.  Specifically, I am concerned about the restrictions that were place on you 
before  the  mast,  your  inability  to  obtain  a  mast  representative,  and  the  circumstances  that  led  to 
you  providing  an  incriminating  statement  to  the  investigating  officer.    As  a  result,  I  believe  it 
would at least appear to be unjust to let this mast stand.  I am therefore dismissing the remaining 
charges against you and your appeal is granted.  
6.    I  am  directing  the  withdrawal  of  the  letter  of  reprimand  and  all  references  to  the  nonjudicial 
punishment from your record.  [The cutter’s command] shall take the administrative action neces-
sary to effect these changes. 
7.  Finally, I want you to understand clearly that my decision to grant your appeal does NOT mean 
I  believe  you  did  not  commit  any  offenses  under  the  UCMJ.    As  I stated above, I am convinced 
that you violated both Articles 125 and 133, UCMJ.  I am deeply concerned about your actions and 
expect your Officer Evaluation Report to document your misconduct. 

 
Page 7 Regarding Alcohol-Related Situation 
 

On April 11, 2003, the XO of the cutter entered a Page 7 in the applicant’s record stated 
that he had been referred to a Naval hospital for alcohol screening.  The Page 7 further states that 
“[a]lthough no alcohol incident was documented, your behavior during the Port Antonio, Jamaica 
port call in  December 2002  indicated that you may have a problem with  alcohol abuse.  this is 
not considered an alcohol incident, but is entered for documentation purposes only as an alcohol 
situation as outlined in Chapter 20 of the Personnel Manual.”10  
 
First Disputed OER 

 
The  applicant’s first  disputed OER in  this case covers his  performance from  October 1, 
2002, through January 31, 2003.  The rating chain included the Assistant Chief for Major Cutter 
Forces as the Supervisor, the Chief for Major Cutter Forces as Reporting Officer, and the Chief 
of Operational Forces as the Reviewer.  The Supervisor marked most of the performance catego-
ries  as  “not  observed,”  rather  than  assigning  a  numerical  mark.    The  “not  observed” marks are 
explained  in  block  3  with  the  following  comment:    “Not  Observed  marks  reflect  Reported  On 
Officer’s  approved  request  to  disqualify  the  regular  shipboard  rating  chain.”    However,  the 
Supervisor assigned the applicant one low mark of 2 for the category “Workplace Climate” and 
supported  the  mark  with  the  following  comment:    “Failed  to  support  or  enforce  Coast  Guard 
human resources policies.  Despite prior counseling about his conduct, [the applicant’s] actions 
during  two  separate  port  calls  created  the  perception  of  an  inappropriate  relationship  and  were 
detrimental  to  unit  good  order  and  discipline.”    Moreover,  the  Reporting  Officer  assigned  the 
applicant marks of 2 in four categories:  “Judgment,” “Responsibility,” “Professional Presence,” 
and “Health and Well-Being.”  He supported these marks with the following comments: 

                                                 
10 Pursuant to the decision in BCMR Docket No. 2007-160, this Page 7 was corrected by removing the phrase “any 
further alcohol incidents may result in your separation from the U.S. Coast Guard” because the statement would only 
be accurate under the Coast Guard’s alcohol abuse policy in Chapter 20 of the Personnel Manual if he already had an 
alcohol incident documented in his record, which he did not. 

 

 

 
Displayed  flawed  judgment  during  two  separate  port  calls;  misuse  of  alcohol  contributed  to  par-
ticipation  in  an  inappropriate  relationship.    Failed  to  heed  command  warnings/advice  about  per-
sonal conduct.  Failed to hold self accountable for inappropriate conduct and failed to demonstrate 
personal courage; submitted OSF [Officer Support Form] materials that did not discuss known port 
call incidents or inappropriate relationship.  Misuse of alcohol conveyed poor self image.  Actions 
served to undermine respect for officers and undercut wardroom cohesiveness. 
 
The Reporting Officer did not assign the applicant a mark on the comparison scale in the 
first  disputed  OER.    He  wrote  that  he  was  “[u]nable  to  comment  on  overall  performance  and 
comparison  to  other  officers  due  to  majority  of  actions  not  being  observed.    However,  the  two 
separate incidents of inappropriate conduct indicate a serious lapse in judgment and a complete 
disregard for core values of honor, respect and devotion to duty.” 

 
The  first  disputed  OER  was  prepared  in  November  2003  and  validated  by  CGPC  in 
December  2003.    In  February  and  March  2004,  the  applicant  submitted  two  OER  Replies  that 
were rejected by CGPC for not complying with the regulations for such replies.  In letters dated 
March  2  and  April  28,  2004,  CGPC  informed  the  applicant  that  many  of  his  comments  in  the 
Reply were not authorized because they were not performance related and concerned his personal 
opinions of the raters.  (In particular, he accused the cutter’s command of having provided false 
information to the substitute rating chain.)  On May 7, 2004, he submitted a revised OER Reply 
that  was  entered  in  his  record.    In  this  Reply,  the  applicant  wrote  that  the  OER  was  based  on 
incorrect  information.    He  alleged  that  there  was  no  “inappropriate  relationship”  between  him 
and another junior officer.  He stated that the comments about alcohol abuse were improper since 
he had never been counseled about alcohol abuse or charged with any violation of Coast Guard 
policy  regarding  the  use  of  alcohol.    He  stated  that  the  comment  about  “counseling”  was  false 
because  what  the  Operations  Officer  said  to  him  following  their  port  call  in  Guantanamo  Bay 
was, “my policy is, and I realize this is not in line with Commandant, is to simply keep it off the 
ship.”  The applicant stated that there was not wrongdoing during the port call and he had no idea 
what the Operations Officer was trying to tell him.  The applicant also objected to the Reporting 
Officer’s comment that he lacked personal courage for not discussing the port calls on his OSF.  
He argued that he was not required to discuss port calls on his OSF.  The Area Commander for-
warded the Reply to CGPC with an endorsement stating that the OER “is accurate as submitted.” 
 
Second Disputed OER 
 

The second disputed OER, covering the period February 1 to July 13, 2003, was also pre-
pared by the substitute rating chain.  All the performance categories are marked “not observed” 
and  block  3  contains  the  following  comment:    “Not  observed  marks  reflect  Reported  On  Offi-
cer’s  approved  request  to  disqualify  the  regular  shipboard  rating  chain.    Mbr  TAD  to  Coast 
Guard Academy for duration of period.” 

 
The applicant’s record also contains a “concurrent OER” covering the period February 1 
to  June  30,  2003.    This  concurrent  OER,  which  was  prepared  by  his  chain  of  command  while 
TAD at the Academy, contains primarily marks of 5 in the various performance categories, a few 
marks of “not observed,” and a mark in the fourth spot on the comparison scale.  All of the writ-
ten comments  are quite positive and the Reporting Officer recommended the applicant  for pro-
motion with his peers. 

 

 

On  January  29,  2004,  the  applicant  acknowledged  receipt  of  CGPC’s  notification  and 

 
 
The  applicant  received  two  more  OERs  based  on  his  performance  as  the  Officer  in 
Charge of a Law Enforcement Detachment with nine subordinates before he was separated from 
the Coast Guard.  On these OERs, he received primarily marks of 5 in the performance catego-
ries, marks in the fifth spot on the comparison scale, and strong recommendations for promotion 
to lieutenant. 
 
Initiation of Revocation Board 
 
 
On January 20, 2004, CGPC informed the applicant that it had initiated action under Arti-
cle  12.A.11.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  “to  convene  a  board  to  recommend  whether  or  not  [his] 
commission  should  be  revoked.”    CGPC  stated  that  it  was  authorized  to  “initiate  such  action 
when information of an adverse nature is discovered.”  CGPC cited the first disputed OER as the 
adverse information that triggered the initiation of the board.  CGPC informed the applicant that 
he had a right to submit comments on his own behalf within twenty-one days.   
 
 
stated that he would submit a statement on his own behalf. 
 
 
On February 17, 2004, CGPC forwarded to the applicant the documents to be considered 
by  the  proposed  Revocation  Board.    CGPC  stated  that  the  board  would  review  the  applicant’s 
PDR and the complete report of the POI dated January 6, 2003, with its enclosures. 
 
 
On March 2, 2004, the applicant submitted an objection to the IO’s report being consid-
ered by the proposed Revocation Board.  He claimed that in overturning the applicant’s NJP, the 
Area  Commander  had  ordered  the  removal  of  all  paperwork  associated  with  the  NJP,  which 
included the IO’s report.  On March 5, 2004, CGPC responded, stating that after reviewing the 
Area Commander’s order overturning the NJP and consulting with legal counsel, CGPC would 
remove from consideration by the Revocation Board the IO’s memorandum with its recommen-
dations, as well as enclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 35 of the IO’s report, but that enclosures 5 through 
34 would be considered by the board.  On March 18, 2004, the applicant objected again through 
his counsel, stating that because the IO’s report could not be entered into the applicant’s PDR, it 
could not be considered by the Revocation Board and that the IO’s report in its entirety was part 
of  the  NJP  proceedings  and  so  were  ordered  removed  from  the  applicant’s  record  by  the  Area 
Commander.  On March 30, 2004, CGPC responded, stating that upon further review, enclosures 
1 and 2 as well as 5 through 34 would be submitted to the Revocation Board for consideration 
because  enclosures  1  and  2  were  official  records.    On  April  19,  2004,  the  applicant’s  counsel 
submitted a third objection to the enclosures to be reviewed by the board, emphasizing that under 
Article 12.A.11.b.3. of the Personnel Manual, only the applicant’s record could be reviewed by 
the Revocation Board and the IO’s report could not be entered in his PDR and so should not be 
reviewed by that board.  On May 6, 2004, Commander, CGPC responded to the third objection, 
stating that Article 12.A.11. does not specify that only the documents in an officer’s PDR can be 
considered by a Revocation Board.  He stated that what is considered an officer’s “record” varies 
depending  upon  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  being  used.    He  noted  that  an  officer’s  “record”  is 
defined  one  way  for  the  purposes  of  promotion  boards  but  may  include  other  documents  and 
information for the purposes of making billet assignments or separation decisions.  He stated that 
because “the purpose of a revocation panel is to determine whether one should continue to serve 

 

 

as an officer, an officer’s record for this purpose may contain information relevant to  that deci-
sion that does not appear in the PDR, provided the information is otherwise trustworthy and reli-
able.”    He  also  noted  that  the  Area  Commander’s  letter  dated  March  24,  2003,  required  the 
removal of only the letter of reprimand and references to the NJP.   Therefore, enclosures 1, 2, 
and 5 through 34 to the IO’s report could properly be included as relevant information because 
they did not mention the letter of reprimand or the NJP. 
 
Resignation and DD 214 
 
 
On  May  18,  2004,  the  applicant  submitted  a  “Request  for  Unqualified  Resignation”  to 
resign  his  commission  as  of  August  1,  2004,  which  would  negate  the  need  for  the  Revocation 
Board, which was slated to convene on May 25, 2004.  He wrote that the “difficulty in correcting 
misinformation contained in an OER, and a disagreement over what material is appropriate to be 
presented  to  the  [Revocation  Board]  has  prompted  this  request  for  resignation.”    On  May  19, 
2004,  CGPC  approved  his  request  as a resignation in  lieu of special board action for reason of 
substandard performance. 
 
 
The  applicant’s  DD  214,  dated  August  1,  2004,  indicates  that  he  was  honorably  dis-
charged under Article 12.1.15. of the Personnel Manual.  (There is no such article.)  The separa-
tion  code  is  BHK  and  the  narrative  reason  for  separation  is  “Substandard  Performance.”    On 
August 22, 2006, the Coast Guard issued a DD 215 to correct the citation on the DD 214 to Arti-
cle  12.B.15.  of  the  Personnel  Manual.    However,  Article  12.B.15.  concerns  only  the  disability 
discharges of enlisted members.11 
 
Discharge Review Board 
 
 
On June 26, 2006, the President of the DRB forwarded the recommendation of the DRB 
to  the  Commandant.    The  DRB  based  its  recommendation  on  the  documents  in  an  applicant’s 
PDR, a letter from the applicant, the applicant’s testimony at a hearing, and documentation of his 
dismissed  mast  and  the  disqualification  of  his  rating  chain,  which  he  showed  the  DRB  at  the 
hearing.  Based on these records, the DRB found no basis for the negative OER in the case file 
and concluded that the substitute rating chain must have based the disputed OER on information 
from  the disqualified rating chain,  which was biased.  The DRB found  that the applicant’s dis-
charge was both improper and inequitable.  It recommended that the separation code and narra-
tive reason for separation on the applicant’s DD 214 be changed to reflect a discharge for “mis-
cellaneous/general  reasons.”    The  DRB  also  recommended  that  the  disputed  OER  be  replaced 
with  a  continuity  OER  and  that  the  applicant  be  offered  reinstatement  on  active  duty  or  in  the 
Reserve without loss of precedence.  The DRB argued that “all actions were based on a Captain’s 
Mast  that  was  found  to  be  improper  and  was  eventually  removed  from  the  record,  all  negative 
actions as a result of that improper action, including the OER mentioned above, should be reme-
died.” 
 

The President of the DRB advised the Commandant that he agreed with the recommend-
ed changes to the separation code and narrative reason for separation on the applicant’s DD 214 

                                                 
11 It appears that the Coast Guard intended to correct the separation authority to Article 12.A.15., which concerns the 
separation of officers “for cause.”   

 

 

but  that  he  did  not  concur  with  the  DRB’s  conclusions  about  the  propriety  and  equity  of  the 
applicant’s discharge.  He stated that the issues the DRB raised about the applicant’s OER “do 
not mitigate the fact that [he] requested, and was subsequently granted, a voluntary resignation in 
lieu of a Revocation Board.  Since he received the separation he requested, I believe that the dis-
charge was both proper and equitable.” 

 
On July 27, 2006, the Commandant disapproved the proceedings and recommendation of 

the DRB and ordered that his DD 214 and other records remain as they are. 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
The  Judge  Advocate  General  (JAG)  of  the  Coast  Guard submitted the original  advisory 
 
opinion  for  this  case  on  December  18,  2007.    He  recommended  that  the  Board  deny  the  appli-
cant’s requests.  In so doing, the JAG adopted the findings and analysis of the case provided in a 
memorandum prepared by CGPC. 
 

With  respect  to  the  first  disputed  OER,  CGPC  stated  that  it  granted  the  applicant’s 
request  for a substitute rating chain  after the applicant’s NJP was overturned due to procedural 
defects.  CGPC stated that although the substitute rating chain members did not directly observe 
the  applicant’s  performance,  they  were  able  to  evaluate  aspects  of  his  performance  based  on 
“credible  information  from  an  administrative  investigation  …  that  showed  [he]  engaged  in  an 
inappropriate  relationship  with  a  fellow  officer.”    CGPC  stated  that  the  substitute  rating  chain 
was entitled to rely on the enclosures to the IO’s report as long as they did not rely on the flawed 
NJP  proceedings.    CGPC  noted that the Area Commander’s letter overturning the NJP showed 
that he expected the applicant’s misconduct to be documented on an OER.  CGPC stated that the 
rating chain properly avoided any mention of the NJP in preparing the two disputed OERs “and 
relied  on  the  facts  as  supported  by  the  enclosures.”    CGPC  concluded  that  the  disputed  OERs 
were prepared in accordance with Coast Guard regulation and policy.   

 
CGPC  alleged  that  it  acted  reasonably,  justifiably,  and  fairly  in  initiating  action  to  con-
vene a Revocation Board based on the adverse information in enclosures 1, 2, and 5 through 34 
to  the  IO’s  report.    CGPC  stated  that  regulations  do  not  restrict  either  CGPC  or  a  Revocation 
Board to only those documents filed in an officer’s PDR.  CGPC stated that a Revocation Board 
may review “available and factual matters of record, such as sworn statements in an administra-
tive investigation,” in addition to the records kept in a PDR.  CGPC noted that in BCMR Docket 
No.  1999-171,  the  BCMR  upheld  the  use  of  material  from  an  investigation  by  Coast  Guard 
Investigative  Service  by  a  special  board  “as  long  as  the  applicant  was  afforded  the  essential 
requirements of due process.”  CGPC stated that the applicant was afforded due process in that 
he was allowed to view and comment on the evidence that would be considered by the Revoca-
tion Board.   

 
CGPC concluded that the applicant was properly discharged based on his approved vol-
untary request  and that the separation code BHK and narrative reason for separation are appro-
priate  under  the  Separation  Program  Designator  Handbook.    In  support  of  its  findings,  CGPC 
submitted copies of some of the enclosures to the IO’s report, which are summarized above, and 
affidavits from the substitute rating chain, as summarized below. 
 

 

 

Declaration of the Supervisor for the Disputed OERs, Dated October 31, 2007 
 
 
The  Supervisor  stated  that  as  the  Assistant  Chief  for  Major  Cutter  Forces  he  routinely 
spoke  with  the  XO  of  the  applicant’s  cutter  during  the  evaluation  periods  for  both  disputed 
OERs.  He stated that he assigned the applicant a mark of 2 for Workplace Climate in the Super-
visor’s section of the first disputed OER based on information in the IO’s report, which his office 
received  before  the  Area  Commander  overturned  the  NJP.    He  alleged  that  he  completed  the 
OER  “fairly,  properly  and  without  bias”  based  on  the  information  in  the  IO’s  report  about  the 
applicant’s unacceptable relationship with a fellow officer aboard his cutter, which is a violation 
of Coast Guard policy on interpersonal relationships.  He noted that Article 8.H.2.d. of the Per-
sonnel  Manual  states  that  unacceptable  relationships  are  “inappropriate  and  not  allowed  under 
service policy.”  The Supervisor further alleged that nothing prohibits the report of an investiga-
tion  convened  under  the  Military  Justice  Manual  from  being  used  for  administrative  purposes, 
such as documenting an officer’s performance in an OER. 
 
Declaration of the Reporting Officers for the Disputed OERs, Dated October 24, 2007 
 
 
The Reporting Officer stated that as Chief of the Atlantic Area’s Major Cutter forces in 
2002 and 2003, he was responsible for programmatic oversight and fleet management of the cut-
ters, including the applicant’s cutter.  He was also the first-line supervisor of the CO of that cut-
ter and therefore had routine contact with him about shipboard matters, including personnel.  The 
Reporting  Officer  stated  that  his  office  became  aware  of  the  NJP  proceedings  during  the  legal 
review after the mast.  He stated that because of the number of NJP proceedings on the cutters, 
his office only reviewed NJP cases that were appealed.  During his office’s review of the appli-
cant’s NJP, he spoke with the CO of the cutter several times and the Supervisor spoke with the 
XO several times to collect facts. 
 
 
When  CGPC  informed  him  that  he  would  have  to  serve  as  the  applicant’s  Reporting 
Office  because  the  applicant  had  requested  a  substitute  rating  chain,  he  queried  the  decision 
because  of  his  lack of observation of the applicant’s performance.  Both  CGPC and the Area’s 
legal  office  told  him  that  the  administrative  investigation  and  the  evidence  therein  “would  be 
appropriate information for my consideration” in evaluating the applicant’s performance, but that 
he could  not  mention  the NJP or the appeal  of the NJP.  In addition, he was told that he could 
mark “‘not observed’ in most categories while still commenting in those areas where I had suffi-
cient information to make an informed opinion.”  Therefore, he based his marks in the disputed 
OER on the statements in the IO’s report, the applicant’s OER input (the OSF), and his own per-
ception  of  the  applicant’s  behavior.    The  Reporting  Officer  stated  that  he  “did  not  discuss  the 
OER with either the CO or XO of the [cutter].” 
 
 
The Reporting Officer denied the applicant’s allegations that he was biased because of his 
prior interaction with the applicant’s father.  He stated that his office had no role in conducting 
the  investigation  or  the  mast  and  only  served  as  a  conduit  of  information  between  the  cutter’s 
command  and  the  Area  Commander  during  the  review  upon  appeal.    The  Reporting  Officer 
denied having ever been negatively counseled about  the NJP or the appeal.   He alleged that he 
was actually “praised for [his] programmatic handling of this sensitive and complex matter.”  He 
stated that he had never met the applicant and had no reason to be biased against him.  Moreover, 
he can recall meeting the applicant’s father  

 

 

 

only briefly at a meeting of several of his fellow contractors, representatives of MLCLANT(v), and 
members of the Operational Forces staff. … I do not recall any awkwardness at the meeting, which 
I  recall as cordially professional.  [The applicant’s father] and his co-workers were contracted to 
look at cutter casualty data and how to present it in terms of overall operational readiness.  Their 
work was neither controversial nor critical.  If they ever filed a final report, I am not aware of it.  
There was not resulting negative pressure or even follow-on discussions related to their particular 
efforts.  A single 1-2 hour meeting certainly did not form the basis for any personal bias. 

 
 
The Reporting Officer stated that in preparing the first disputed OER, he “felt duty-bound 
to  comment  on  [the  applicant’s]  inappropriate  behavior  on  two  separate  occasions,  particularly 
how those lapses, fueled by alcohol, reflected on his judgment, responsibility and general adher-
ence to CG core values.  I stand by those original marks and comments.” 
 
Declaration of the Reporting Officers for the Disputed OERs, Dated October 16, 2007 
 
 
The Reviewer of the disputed OERs, who was the Chief of the Operational Forces Branch 
for the Area, is now retired.  He stated that as the CO’s reporting officer, he was the first person 
to review the applicant’s mast appeal and he discovered “the fatal flaws in the NJP administra-
tive proceedings by the [cutter’s command].  I personally recommended to [the Area Command-
er] that the 5-day period for submission of the appeal be waived and that the mast be overturned.  
This was done in consultation with [the Area legal advisor].”  The Area Commander agreed with 
his  assessment  and  overturned  the  NJP  based  upon  the  procedural  errors  but  directed  that  the 
applicant’s underlying conduct  be documented on his  OER.  The Reviewer alleged that but for 
the  procedural  errors,  which  he  listed  as  “no  mast  rep[resentative],  circumstances  leading  [the 
applicant]  to  [make]  an  incriminating  statement,  and  pre-mast  restrictions,”  the  NJP  would  not 
have been overturned.  The Reviewer stated that he personally reprimanded the CO of the cutter 
for his performance with respect to the applicant’s mast. 

 
The  Reviewer  stated  that  because  the  applicant  decided  to  have  his  regular  rating  chain 
disqualified,  officers  who  did  not  personally  observe  his  performance  during  the  evaluation 
period were required to prepare the OER.  However, the Reviewer argued, “OERs are routinely 
written by supervisors and reporting officers on personnel with whom they do not have routine 
personal observation” when the facts are otherwise “well known and documented.”  He alleged 
that ignoring the applicant’s misconduct during the evaluation period “was not an option,” espe-
cially given the Area Commander’s direction in the March 24, 2003, letter.  He also alleged that 
“[a]ll  personnel  in  the  rating  chain  for  this  OER  had  personal  knowledge  of  the  [applicant’s] 
negative performance.” 

 
Regarding  the  allegation  that  he  was  biased  because  of  his  prior  interaction  with  the 

applicant’s father, the Reviewer stated that he  

 
always had the utmost respect [for the applicant’s father] while we served together as Officers in 
the  Coast  Guard.    Although  he  was  always  senior  to  me  with  respect  to  linear  numbers,  I  have 
never worked for, [or] worked with [him], nor did he work for me.  We were simply members of 
the  same  community,  the  Surface  Operations  community  …  a  tight-knit  group  that  always  had 
shown respect and admiration for each other.  Although I am somewhat offended by these [allega-
tions of grudge and bias], I still have the utmost respect for [the applicant’s father], and will dis-
miss them as comments made by a concerned father wanting the best for their child. 
 

 

 

2.    [The  applicant’s  father]  references  a  project  that  we  worked  together  after his retirement that 
may  have  led  to  this  bias.    To  my  recollection,  he  was  working  as  a civilian contractor on a CG 
funded  project  and  he  conducted  one  interview  with  myself  and  the  Operational  Forces  Branch.  
This survey was conducted in my office and as far as I remember ended amicably.  I honestly can-
not even remember the subject of the study. 
 
3.  [The applicant’s father] also states that I purposely withheld information about his son, includ-
ing his whereabouts after the [cutter] issue.  The only conversation I can recall was one in which I 
told  [him] that I was not at liberty to discuss his son’s case with respect to the incident, the NJP 
case,  and  the  subsequent  performance  evaluations.    [The  applicant]  is  an  adult  and  information 
concerning him, other then Health and Well being, is protected even from a parent under the Pri-
vacy  Act.    I  informed [the applicant’s father] that any information concerning his son’s perform-
ance needed to be obtained directly from his son.  I even referred him to MCLANT legal if he had 
additional questions. 
 
4.  … I believe the [disputed OER] was correct and administratively appropriate.  The [Supervisor 
and  Reporting  Officer]  had  personal  knowledge/observation  of  the  negative  performance  dimen-
sions  outside  of  the  NJP  case.    To  my  knowledge  no  mention  of  the  NJP  was  included  in  [the 
applicant’s] record by Atlantic Area, and there is no personal bias by me held against [him] or his 
father and, in fact, I was first and his strongest advocate for granting his mast appeal. 
 
On March 12, 2010, the JAG submitted an advisory opinion in response to the applicant’s 
request  for  reconsideration  and  addressed  only  the  allegation  of  bias  because  the Chair granted 
reconsideration on the basis of the new evidence submitted by the applicant about the incident—
i.e.,  the  message  traffic.    The  JAG  argued  that  the  new  evidence  is  immaterial  and  does  not 
“overcome the good faith presumption afforded to military officers” and that the applicant “has 
failed to articulate a causal connection regarding the alleged Command bias and the submission 
of  the  [migrant  incident] report.”  Moreover, the JAG argued, any bias on the part of the com-
mand was cured when the Area Commander overturned the applicant’s NJP. 

 

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

In response to the original advisory opinion, the applicant alleged that the JAG’s recom-
mendation constitutes a reversal of its prior recommendation that the Commandant approve the 
recommendation of the DRB to grant relief.  He argued that his resignation cannot be considered 
voluntary because CGPC refused to remove all the enclosures to the IO’s report from considera-
tion by the proposed Revocation Board.  Therefore, his resignation was coerced, not voluntary. 

 
The applicant alleged that the investigation into his relationship with LTJG X was not an 
informal  administrative  investigation  but  a  pre-disciplinary  investigation  governed  by  the  Mili-
tary Justice Manual.  Therefore, the entire IO’s report with all of its enclosures is “an integral part 
of the NJP proceedings,” which were ordered removed from his record by the Area Commander.  
However,  instead  of  fully  removing  them,  CGPC  threatened  to  use  them  for  the  Revocation 
Board  and  is  now  submitting  them  for  consideration  by  the  BCMR.    He  argued  that  when  the 
Area  Commander  ordered  the  removal  of  the  NJP  proceedings, including the  IO’s report, from 
his record, CGPC should have destroyed them or, at least, made it impossible for them to be used 
against him in any subsequent forum. 

 
The applicant stated that the substitute rating chain must have relied on information from 
the applicant’s XO and CO in  preparing the OER and on information in the IO’s report, which 

 

 

the  Area  Commander  had  ordered  removed  from  his  record,  because  they  never  personally 
observed his performance and had no direct knowledge of it.  The applicant further alleged that it 
was unfair for the substitute rating chain to assign him so many marks of “not observed” and then 
to assign him very low marks in certain categories based up “a single set of circumstances” rather 
than his overall performance in those categories as documented in his OSF. 

 
The applicant argued that Article 8.H. of the Personnel Manual does not prohibit the con-
duct of which he was accused.  He also alleged that under Articles 8.H.6.c. and e., “allegations of 
violations cannot be used against personnel in their formal evaluations (such as OERs), until they 
are counseled and an administrative entry made in their personnel record,” which his command 
failed to do. 

 
The applicant again disputed CGPC’s decision to allow the Revocation Board to see any 
record pertaining to the applicant except those filed in his PDR.  He argued that the Coast Guard 
is bound by its own regulations and that it should have written Article 12.A.11.b.3. differently if 
documents  outside  the  PDR  were  to  be  considered.    The  applicant  argued  that  the  “clear  and 
obvious meaning” of the phrase “officer’s record” in Article 12.A.11.b.3. is an officer’s PDR and 
does not include any other documents, such as the report of an IO.  

 
The applicant  argued that the IO’s report should have been removed from consideration 
by  the  Revocation  Board  because  he  was  not  provided  due  process.    He  alleged  that  he  was 
denied due process because his statements were coerced by threat, he was denied legal counsel, 
and  he  was  illegally  detained.    The  applicant  further  argued  that  in  the  case  cited  by  the  Coast 
Guard, BCMR Docket No. 1999-171, the investigation had not been ordered removed from that 
applicant’s record. 

 
In  response  to  the  JAG’s  advisory  opinion  for  his  reconsideration  request,  the applicant 
alleged that the cutter’s claims of broken communications equipment were false.  He submitted a 
CASEREP  report  of  equipment  repairs  dated  December  20,  2002—the  day  before  the  cutter 
came upon the migrant vessel at issue—which shows the following equipment in need of repair:  
Radar  Cab.  UD403  Pan  D,  Hydraulic  Oil  Purifier,  VIGC  ON-143(V6)  (JOTS  Computer),  and 
#1SSDG Prelube Pump. 

 
The applicant reported that the current XO of the cutter had advised him that there was no 
copy of any investigation into the migrant interdiction aboard the cutter.  He submitted a copy of 
an email from the XO confirming this allegation.  The applicant stated that the Deputy Chief of 
the Atlantic Area Legal office told him that an investigation “had been started” but that she found 
no Class A Mishap report when she checked the file on the migrant interdiction.  The applicant 
alleged  that  an  investigation  was  required  under  the  Administrative  Investigations  Manual  and 
that the Board should presume that an alleged investigation occurred and that the disappearance 
of the report allows a negative inference that the report revealed wrongdoing on the part of the 
command.  Therefore, the applicant argued, the disappearance of the alleged report is strong evi-
dence  supporting  the  command’s  bias  against  him.    In  addition,  he  argued,  the  bias  cannot  be 
considered  to  have  been  “cured”  by  the  removal  of  the  NJP  from  his  record because he subse-
quently  received  negative  OERs  and was threatened with  an illegal  Revocation Board and thus 
coerced to resign. 

 

 

 

The  applicant  also  submitted  a  statement  from  his  father,  a  retired  Coast  Guard  captain 
who has been involved in more than 50 migrant interdictions and who alleged that the CO of the 
cutter erred by (1) not having control over the migrant vessel before beginning the transfer of the 
migrants,  (2)  not  putting  life  jackets  on  all  migrants  before  beginning  the  transfer,  (3)  not  sus-
pending  the  law  enforcement  operation and switch to  a search and rescue operation until  every 
migrant  was  accounted  for,  (4)  leaving the area without permission  from  the search and rescue 
operations center, and (5) sinking the vessel with gunfire while there were still unaccounted for 
migrants in the water.   

 

APPLICABLE LAW 

Regulations about Personal Relationships  

 
 
Article  8.H.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  in  effect  in  2002  concerns  personal  relationships 
among  Coast  Guard  personnel.    Article  8.H.1.c.  states  that  “interpersonal  relationships  which 
raise even a perception of unfairness undermine good leadership and military discipline.”  Article 
8.H.2.d.3. provides the following descriptions of types of relationships: 
 

a. Personal relationship: Non-intimate, non-romantic association between two or more people (of 
the  same  gender  or  not),  such  as  occasional  attendance  at  recreational  or  entertainment  events 
(movies,  ball  games,  concerts,  etc.)  or  meals.  (Does  not  involve  conduct  which  violates  the 
UCMJ.) 
b. Romantic relationship: Cross-gender sexual or amorous relationship.  (Does not involve conduct 
which violates the UCMJ.) 
c. Unacceptable relationship: Inappropriate and not allowed under Service policy. Resolution nor-
mally administrative.  Relationship must be terminated or otherwise resolved once recognized. 
d. Prohibited relationship: Violates the UCMJ. Resolution may be either administrative, punitive, 
or both as circumstances warrant. 

 

Article 8.H.2.e. states that a relationship does not violate Service policy unless “the rela-
tionship or the members' conduct fails to meet the standards set by this section, standards of con-
duct set by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or other regulations.”  
 

Article 8.H.2.f. states that a romantic relationship between any two members assigned to 
the same cutter constitutes an “unacceptable romantic relationship” that violates Service policy.  
The  article  explains  that  “[t]he  nature  of  operations  and  personnel  interactions  on  cutters  and 
small  shore  units  makes  romantic  relationships  between  members  assigned  to  such  units  the 
equivalent  of  relationships  in  the  chain  of  command  and,  therefore,  unacceptable.  This  policy 
applies regardless of rank, grade, or position.” 
 

Article 8.H.6.c. states that when a command has “potential concerns about the character-
istics  of  a  relationship,”  the  members  may  be  informally  or  formally  counseled  and  may  be 
ordered  to  terminate  a  relationship.    Article  8.H.6.d.  states  that  “[m]embers  may  request  or  a 
command  may  recommend  reassignment  of  a  member  involved  in  a  questionable  relationship.  
However, reassignment is  not a preferred option.  The Coast Guard is not obligated to reassign 
personnel due to members’ desires or based solely on a relationship.  When reassignment is not 
an option, members may be directed to end a relationship.”  Article 8.H.6.e. states that “[w]hen 
members  do  not  respond  favorably  to  counseling,  comments  and  marks  in  officer  and  enlisted 

 

 

evaluations  may  be  appropriate.”    Under  Articles  8.H.6.f.  and  8.H.6.g.,  commands  may  award 
NJP, prefer charges for court-martial, or recommend separation. 

 

Regulations about Investigations 
 
 
Article  1.C.2.a.  of  the  Administrative  Investigations  Manual  (AIM)  in  effect  in  January 
2003 states that “[i]f there is no basis for investigation other than prospective disciplinary action, 
a preliminary inquiry under RCM 303, MCM, or a pretrial investigation under article 32, UCMJ 
and RCM 405, MCM should be conducted without recourse to the proceedings of an administra-
tive investigation under this manual.” 
 

Rule  303  of  the  Rules  for  Courts-Martial  (RCM)  in  the  Manual  for  Courts-Martial 
(MCM) states that “[u]pon receipt of information that a member of the command is accused or 
suspected of committing an offense or offenses triable by court-martial, the immediate comman-
der shall make or cause to be made a preliminary inquiry into the charges or suspected offenses.”  
The discussion for this rule in the MCM states the following: 

 
The  preliminary  inquiry  is  usually  informal.    It  may  be  an  examination  of  the  charges  and  an 
investigative  report  or  other  summary  of  expected  evidence.    In  other  cases  a  more  extensive 
investigation may be necessary.  Although the commander may conduct the investigation person-
ally or with members of the command, in serious or complex cases the commander should consider 
whether to seek the assistance of law enforcement personnel in conducting any inquiry or further 
investigation.    The  inquiry  should  gather  all  reasonably  available  evidence  bearing  on  guilt  or 
innocence … 

 

Article 1.B.1.a. and c. of the Coast Guard’s Military Justice Manual (MJM) provide that 
any  member  who  becomes  aware  of  an  offense  under  the  UCMJ  may  complete  and  submit  an 
offense  report,  form  CG-4910,  to  his  or  her  command,  and  “[a]ny  report  of  misconduct  may 
serve as the basis for initiating a preliminary inquiry.” 

 
Article 1.B.3.a. of the MJM provides that when a member has been charged with viola-
tions  of  the  UCMJ,  a  CG-4910  is  normally  completed,  forwarded  to,  and  “reviewed  by  the 
executive  officer.  …    If  the  executive  officer  determines  that  nonjudicial  punishment  may  be 
appropriate, he or she should advise the member of the general nature of the offense that he or 
she  is  suspected  of  committing  and  that  the  command  is  considering  imposition  of  nonjudicial 
punishment.  The  executive  officer  should  designate  a  preliminary  inquiry  officer  [PIO]  to  con-
duct a preliminary inquiry.  If appropriate, the executive officer may dismiss the matter, if dele-
gated this authority by the commanding officer.” 
 

Article  1.B.3.c.  of  the  MJM  states  that  “[t]he  executive  officer  normally  designates  a 
member of the command to conduct a preliminary inquiry. The designation may be made orally 
or in writing.”  Article 1.B.4. states that the duties of a PIO include  

 

reviewing  the  description  of  each  suspected  offense  in  the  Manual  for  Courts-Martial  and 

 
addressing each element of each offense during his inquiry; 
  conducting a preliminary investigation either remotely or on-site; 
  questioning witnesses who have information  about  an alleged  offense and gathering written 
statements from them; 

 

 

  preparing summaries of interviews of witnesses who refuse to provide statements; 
  collecting documents such as log entries and other evidence of suspected offenses; 
  correcting the CG-4910 based on his findings if necessary; and 
  completing a preliminary inquiry report, with a summary of events and supporting materials, 
as  well  as  the  PIO’s  own  findings,  opinions,  and  recommendations  about  whether  should  con-
vene a mast to dispose of the offenses, refer the charges for court-martial, and/or take adminis-
trative actions, such as preparing OERs or initiating separation. 

   
Article 1.B.4.a.(4) of the MJM specifically states that it “is usually recommended that the 
PIO not question the suspect until after collecting available evidence and questioning other wit-
nesses.    By  doing  so,  the  PIO  is  better  prepared  to  interview  the  suspect,  formulate  questions, 
confront issues in contention and ascertain the suspect's credibility.” 
  
Under Article 1.B.5. of the MJM, an XO shall review a PIO’s report as well as the CG-
 
4910, which the XO may amend as necessary.  The XO has authority to dismiss the charges, if 
such authority is delegated to the XO by the CO, or the XO may refer the matter to the CO with a 
recommendation that the charges be disposed of at mast or referred for trial by court-martial.  If 
the XO decides that the charges should be disposed of at mast, the XO notifies the member. 

Laws and Regulations about Restraints and Confinement 

 
Chapter 1.B.2. of the MJM states that “[p]re-mast confinement or restriction is not autho-
rized. A member may be placed in pretrial restraint only if the command is considering referring 
the charges against the member for trial by special or general court-martial. A command may not 
automatically  place  a  member  in  restraint  solely  because  he  or  she  has  been  placed  on  report. 
Pretrial  restraint,  including  pretrial  restriction  or  confinement,  may  be  imposed  only  in  very 
limited circumstances [see, RCM 304 and 305]. Generally, pretrial restraint may be imposed only 
if  necessary  to  ensure  an  accused's  presence  at  trial  or  to  prevent  the commission  of additional 
serious  offenses.  The  member  must  be  immediately  released  from  restraint  if  the  command 
decides to dispose of the offense(s) other than at court-martial.” 
 

Under  Rule  304  of  the  Rules  for  Courts-Martial,  a  CO  may  impose  pre-trial  restraints, 
such as orders prohibiting communications with potential witnesses if there is probable cause to 
do so, which requires a reasonable belief that (a) an offense triable by court-martial (against the 
UCMJ) has been committed; (b) the person restrained committed it; and (c) the restraint ordered 
is required by the circumstances.  The discussion to the rule requires restraints to permit pretrial 
preparations. 

 
Under Rule 305 of the Rules for Courts-Martial, a CO may physically confine a member 
if there is probable cause to do so, which requires a reasonable belief that (a) an offense triable by 
court-martial  (against  the  UCMJ)  has  been  committed;  (b)  the  person  restrained  committed  it; 
and  (c)  the  confinement  is  required  by  the  circumstances.    However,  a  member  so  confined  is 
entitled  to  be  informed  of  his  rights  and  of  the  procedures  by  which  his  confinement  will  be 
reviewed.  Within 72 hours of the confinement order, the CO must release the member from con-
finement  unless the CO also  finds, in  addition  to  the above criteria for probable cause, (d) that 
the confinement is necessary either to ensure the member’s presence for a trial, pre-trial hearing, 

 

 

or  investigation  or  to  prevent  “serious  criminal  misconduct,”  such  as  intimidation  of  witnesses 
and obstruction of justice, and (e) that less severe forms of restraint are inadequate. 

Laws and Regulations about the Applicant’s NJP 

Article 92 of the UCMJ concerns a member’s failure to obey a lawful order or regulation.  
 
Article  125  concerns  sodomy,  the  definition  of  which  includes  oral  sex.    Article  133  concerns 
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.  Article 134 concerns adultery, the definition of 
which requires “sexual intercourse” between two people while at least one of them is married to 
a third person. 

 
 
Under Article 15 of the UCMJ, commanding officers, at their discretion, may impose NJP 
for minor violations of the UCMJ to maintain good order and discipline when administrative cor-
rective measures seem inadequate and court-martial seems excessive.  Manual for Courts-Martial 
(MCM), Part V, Para. 1.d.(1).  Only members who are not “attached to or embarked in a vessel” 
may refuse NJP by demanding trial by court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 815(a);  MCM, Part V, Para. 3.  
Under  MCM,  Part  V,  Para.  4.a.,  “[i]f,  after  a  preliminary  inquiry  (see  R.C.M.  303,  the  [NJP] 
authority determines that disposition by [NJP] is appropriate …, the [NJP] authority” must pro-
vide  the  member  with  notification  of  the  pending  mast  proceeding  and  the  alleged  offenses,  a 
brief  summary  of  the  information  upon  which  the  allegations  are  based,  and  a  statement  of his 
rights at mast.”  The member is entitled, inter alia, to appear before the officer imposing NJP; to 
examine documents to be considered by the NJP authority; to be accompanied by a spokesperson 
to speak on his behalf (but not to question witnesses) unless the punishment is significantly lim-
ited and unless the mast would have to be delayed to permit the presence of a selected spokesper-
son; to present matters in defense, extenuation, and mitigation orally, or in writing, or both; and 
to present witnesses.  MCM, Part V, Para. 4.c. 
 

“Failure to comply with any of the procedural provisions of Part V of this Manual shall 
not  invalidate  a  punishment  imposed  under  Article  15,  unless  the  error  materially  prejudiced  a 
substantial right of the servicemember on whom the punishment was imposed.”  MCM, Part V, 
Para. 1.h. 

 
Article 15 and Part V of the Manual for Courts-Martial “do not apply to include, or limit 
use of administrative corrective measures that promote efficiency and good order and discipline. 
…  Administrative  corrective  measures  are  not  punishment,  and  they  may  be  used  for  acts  or 
omissions  which  are  not  offenses  under  the  code  or  for  acts  or  omissions  which  are  offenses 
under the code.”  MCM, Part V, Para.1.g. 
 

Chapter 1.C.2.b. of the MJM states that a “member attached to or embarked in a vessel 
has  no  right  to  demand trial  by court-martial  in  lieu of NJP or, consequently, to  consult  with  a 
military or civilian attorney prior to NJP regarding the option to demand trial by court-martial.” 

 
Under Chapters 1.C.3.a. and 1.B.3.b. of the MJM, the XO should appoint an officer of the 
unit  to  serve  as  the  “mast representative” for the accused.   Chapter 1.C.1. states that because a 
mast is not an adversarial proceeding, a member “has no right to be represented by an attorney at 
mast.”  However, “the member may obtain the services of an attorney or any other person, at no 
expense  to  the  government,  to  appear  as  his  or her spokesperson.”  Chapter 1.C.4.c. states that 

 

 

the  CO  “may  not  exclude  the  spokesperson from  the mast solely because he or she is  an attor-
ney.”   

 
Under  Chapter  1.C.3.a.,  the  role  of  the  mast  representative  is  to  “assist  the  member  in 
preparing  for  and  presenting  his  or  her  side  of  the  matter  and  to  speak  for  the  member,  if  the 
member  desires.    It  is  Coast  Guard  policy  that  the mast representative may question witnesses, 
submit  questions  to  be  asked  of  witnesses,  present  evidence,  and  make  statements  inviting  the 
commanding officer’s attention to  those matters he or she feels are important or essential to an 
appropriate disposition of the matter.”   

 
Chapter  1.C.4.b.  states  that  the  role  of  a  spokesperson  is  to  speak  for  the  member  “at 
those times during the mast when the member’s responses are invited by the commanding offi-
cer.    A  spokesperson  may  be  anyone,  including  an  attorney  retained  by  the  member.”   Chapter 
1.C.4.e. provides that a “spokesperson is not permitted to examine or cross-examine witnesses,” 
except  at  the  discretion  of  the  CO,  but  “is  always  permitted  to  speak  for  a  member  when  the 
member is otherwise entitled to speak.” 

 
Chapter  1.E.  provides  that  the  maximum  punishment  a  captain  (O-6)  may  impose  on  a 
subordinate  officer  at  mast  is  an  admonition  or  reprimand  and  30  days  of  restriction.    Chapter 
1.F.1.  provides  that  a  member  may  appeal  an  NJP  “if  he  or  she  considers  the  punishment 
imposed ‘unjust’ or ‘disproportionate’ to the acts of misconduct for which punished … in writing 
within 5 calendar days of the imposition of the punishment.”  Chapter 1.F.1.a. defines “unjust” to 
include various kinds of illegality and denial of rights. 
 
Regulations about OERs 
 
 
Under Article 10.A.2. of the Personnel Manual, an officer’s rating chain usually consists 
of his direct supervisor who observes and directs his work on a daily basis; his reporting officer, 
who  is  usually  the  supervisor’s  supervisor;  and  the  reviewer,  who  is  usually  the  reporting  offi-
cer’s supervisor.   Under Article 10.A.2.g., an officer may ask that one or more members of his 
rating chain be “disqualified,” which includes “any situation in which a personal interest or con-
flict on the part of the Supervisor, Reporting Officer, or Reviewer raises a substantial question as 
to  whether the Reported-on Officer will receive a fair, accurate evaluation.”  Rating chain offi-
cials  may  base  their  evaluations  on  direction  observation  of  an  officer’s  performance,  the  offi-
cer’s own OER input, and other reliable records and reports about his performance. 
 

Article 10.A.4.f.1. prohibits a rating chain from mentioning that an “officer’s conduct is 
the subject of a judicial, administrative, or investigative proceeding, including criminal and non-
judicial punishment proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, … except as pro-
vided in Article 10.A.3.c. … These restrictions do not preclude comments on the conduct that is 
the subject of the proceeding.  They only prohibit reference to the proceeding itself.” 

 
Article 10.A.3.c.2., which concerns “Concurrent OERs,” states that a “concurrent OER is 
an OER submitted in addition to a regular or special OER. The permanent unit’s OER is never 
considered a concurrent report and should not be so identified.  A concurrent report is always in 
addition  to  a regular or special OER, and thus does not count for continuity. The unit to which 
the Reported-on Officer is permanently attached is always responsible for ensuring that continu-

 

 

ity is maintained with either regular or special OERs. Concurrent reports may be submitted only 
when  the  officer  is:  …  e.  Performing  temporary  assigned  duty  (TAD)  away  from  a  permanent 
station for a period of at least 60 consecutive days while being observed by a senior other than 
the regular Reporting Officer.”   
 

Under Article 10.A.4.g., an officer may submit a Reply to any OER for entry in his record 
with the OER.  Article 10.A.4.g.1. states that “[r]eplies provide an opportunity for the Reported-
on Officer to express a view of performance which may differ from that of a rating official.  Arti-
cle  10.A.4.g.2.  states  that  “[c]omments  should  be  performance-oriented,  either  addressing  per-
formance not contained in the OER or amplifying the reported performance. Restrictions outlined 
in  Article  10.A.4.f.  apply.  Comments  pertaining  strictly  to  interpersonal  relations  or  a  personal 
opinion of the abilities or qualities of a rating chain member are not permitted.” 
 
Regulations about the Documentation of Alcohol Abuse 

 
Article  20.B.2.d.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  states  the  following  about  “Alcohol-Related 

Situations”: 

 
An  alcohol-related  situation  is  defined  as  any  situation  in  which  alcohol  was  involved or present 
but was not considered a causative factor for a member's undesirable behavior or performance. A 
member  does  not  have  to  consume  alcohol  to  meet  this  criterion,  e.g.,  purchasing  alcohol  for 
minors.  Commands  shall  not  use the term “alcohol related situations” when a member's behavior 
clearly meets the criteria of an “alcohol incident.” Members involved in alcohol related situations 
shall  be  counseled  on  their  use  of  alcohol  and informed of the conduct expected of Coast Guard 
members.    Commanding  officers  are  strongly  encouraged  to  consider  whether  screening  and/or 
alcohol awareness training such as IMPACT is appropriate. Commanding officers shall document 
such  occurrences  with  an  appropriate  Administrative  Remarks  (CG-3307)  entry  in  the  member's 
Personnel  Data  Record  (PDR).  Documentation  of  alcohol  related  situations  provides  commands 
with  significant  background  information  for  determining  whether  any  administrative  or  medical 
action is necessary. 

 

Article 20.A.2.d.1. defines an “alcohol incident” as “[a]ny behavior, in which alcohol is 
determined, by the commanding officer, to be a significant or causative factor, that results in the 
member's  loss  of  ability  to  perform  assigned  duties,  brings  discredit  upon  the  Uniformed  Ser-
vices, or is a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Federal, State, or local laws. The 
member need not be found guilty at court-martial, in a civilian court, or be awarded non-judicial 
punishment for the behavior to be considered an alcohol incident.”  Article 20.B.2.h.1. states that 
“[o]fficers  will  be  processed  for  separation  following  a  second  alcohol  incident.”    There  is  no 
corresponding regulation requiring the separation of officers involved in more than one “alcohol-
related situation.” 
 
Regulations about Revoking a Commission 
 

Article 12.A.11. of the Personnel Manual concerns “Revoking Officers’ Commissions in 

Their First Three Years of Service.”  Article 12.A.11.a.1. states the following: 

 
The Service considers  the first three [pen and ink change to “five”] years of an officer’s career a 
probationary  period  during  which  he  or  she  demonstrates  ability  to  adapt  to  the  requirements  of 
Coast Guard life and shows capability for future development. Some officers either are unable to 

 

 

adapt  to  service  life  or  their  performance  indicates  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  time  and  effort 
required will form them into effective officers. 
 
Article 12.A.11.b. provides the following procedures for revocation: 
 
1.  A  commanding  officer  or  a  superior  in  the  chain  of  command  may  recommend  revoking  the 
commission of an officer who has fewer than three [pen and ink change to “five”] years of conti-
nuous service as a Coast Guard commissioned officer. Commander (CGPC-opm) also may initiate 
board action to revoke an officer’s regular commission based on knowledge of adverse information 
about  the  officer.  A  commanding  officer  or  superior  in  the  chain  of  command  shall  recommend 
revocation  in  the  form  of  a letter to Commander (CGPC-opm) containing the following informa-
tion.  
 

a. Officer’s name; 
b. Length of service; 
c. Period of time officer was observed; 
d. Reason for recommendation; 
e. Specific facts or circumstances relating to performance; 
f. Medical reports or opinions, if applicable; 
g. Nature of counseling and other steps taken to correct deficiencies; 
h. Officer’s response to counseling; 
i. Special Officer Evaluation Report, if applicable. 

 

 
2.  The  recommending  officer  shall  grant  the  officer  concerned  an  opportunity  to  review  the  rec-
ommendation and permit him or her to comment as desired by letter endorsement. 
 
3. A panel of senior officers, normally consisting of the Coast Guard Personnel Command’s Chief, 
Administration Division; Chief, Officer Personnel Management Division; and a senior officer rep-
resentative  from  the  Headquarters  division  …  with  cognizance  of  the  officer’s  specialty  shall 
review  the  recommendation.  After  thoroughly  reviewing  the  officer’s  record,  the  panel  recom-
mends to the Commandant either executing the revocation proceedings under this Article or clos-
ing the case. … 
 
4. Commander (CGPC-opm) sends the panel’s recommendations to the Commandant for approval, 
modification, or disapproval (14 U.S.C. 281). 

COMDTINST 1410.2 is entitled “Documents Viewed by Coast Guard Officer Promotion 

 
 
and Special Boards” and states the following in paragraph 5.a.: 
 

The purpose of a special board governs the scope of information to be provided to the board. The 
board is provided records relevant to the intended purpose of the board.  The opinions of criminal 
investigators are not usually provided to a special board, but the statement of witnesses upon which 
those opinions are based should be provided to the board if relevant to the purpose for which the 
board is convened.  

 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

The Board makes the following findings and conclusions on the basis of the applicant’s 

 
 
military record and submissions, the Coast Guard’s submission, and applicable law: 
 
 
The application was timely. 
 

1. 

The  Board  has  jurisdiction  concerning  this matter pursuant  to  10 U.S.C. § 1552.  

 

 

3. 

4. 

2. 

The applicant requested an oral hearing before the Board.  The Chair, acting pur-
 
suant to 33 C.F.R. § 52.51, denied the request and recommended disposition of the case without 
a hearing.  The Board concurs in that recommendation. 
 
 
The  applicant  asked  the  Board  to  remove  from  his  record  (a)  two  OERs;  (b)  all 
documents relating to an informal investigation, to an alleged  inappropriate relationship, and to 
his NJP on January 7, 2003; (c) a Page 7 dated April 11, 2003, concerning his referral for alcohol 
screening; (d) any administrative action taken in whole or in part on the basis of the OERs and 
NJP;  and  (e)  the  potential  revocation  of  his  commission,  his  resignation,  and  his  discharge 
papers.  He also asked the Board to offer him the opportunity to return to active duty with back 
pay and allowances.  In the alternative, he asked the Board to correct his DD 214 to show that he 
was discharged for “Miscellaneous/General Reasons” with separation code FND and to remove 
the DD 215 from his record. 
 
 
The applicant alleged that the charges against him, his punishment at mast, and all 
of the subsequent negative events were a product of bias because the command knew that he had 
sent his father an email accusing the CO of having tried to cover up migrant deaths and wrong-
doing  regarding  a  migrant  interdiction  on  December  21,  2002.    The  applicant  did  not  submit  a 
copies  of  the  alleged  emails,  which  (assuming  arguendo  they  were  sent)  may  or  may  not  have 
been  seen  by  the  command.    Moreover,  the  message  traffic  that  he  has  submitted  shows  no 
intentional  wrongdoing  by  his  command  and  that  the  migrant  deaths  were  promptly  reported.  
The message traffic shows that although the command’s decision to leave the area at about 2:00 
p.m.  on  January  21,  2002—approximately  4.5  hours  after  the  crew  finished  bringing  the  192 
migrants  aboard  the  cutter—was  originally  questioned,  the  command  did  not  learn  of  the  three 
missing migrants until after the cutter departed the area following its search and that communi-
cations from the CO later that day, which are not in the message traffic but were apparently about 
the cutter’s search for migrants, satisfied the District that the cutter had done what was required 
to try to find any remaining migrants.  The allegations of error in how the interdiction was con-
ducted by the applicant’s father may be true, but he was not aboard the cutter and so cannot know 
for certain what happened or what the crew did or did not do. 
 

The  message  traffic  also  shows  that  faulty  communications  equipment  caused  the  com-
mand not to receive an order to return to the last known position of the migrant vessel.  Although 
the applicant  alleged that the CASEREP  repair list for December 20, 2002—the day before the 
cutter encountered the migrant vessel—proves that the claims of faulty equipment are false, the 
Board disagrees.  In this regard, the Board notes that the equipment may not have malfunctioned 
badly enough to be reported prior to December 21, 2002.  In addition, in the message traffic, the 
command  reported  that  although  the  cutter’s  equipment  appeared  to  work fine, they still could 
not communicate with GANTSEC, and this lack of communication is confirmed in GANTSEC’s 
own messages about trying to fix the problem.   

 
The  applicant  also  argued  that  the  Board  should  draw  a  negative  inference  from  the 
alleged disappearance of a report of an investigation, which he argued must have occurred under 
the rules in the Administrative Investigations Manual.  However, he did not cite a particular para-
graph  in  that  manual  that  would  require  an  investigation  of  every  migrant  interdiction  or  sus-
pected migrant drowning case, and the Board knows of none.  The Case Report shows only that 
whether  there  should  be  an  investigation  was  under  discussion.    Assuming  arguendo  that  the 

 

 

incident was investigated in 2002, the fact that it was not found during a FOIA search six years 
later in 2008 does not prove that there was a cover-up or conspiracy. 

5. 

 
The applicant’s allegations about the CO modifying the log to cover up negligence with 
regard to the search are not supported by any evidence.  Moreover, even if the applicant proved 
wrongdoing on the part of the CO with respect to the migrant interdiction, he has not proved that 
he sent emails to his father accusing his CO of wrongdoing or that the command read the alleged 
emails.  Aside from the allegations of the applicant’s own father, nothing in the record supports 
the  applicant’s  claim  that  his  chain  of  command  retaliated  against  him  by  charging  him  with 
offenses  under  the  UCMJ  or  that  the  evidence  against  him  gathered  by  the  IO  was  false  and 
fabricated  in  retaliation  for  the  alleged  emails.    The  Board  finds  that  the  applicant  has  not 
overcome the presumption of regularity12 or proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
command had any reason to be biased against him because of alleged emails to his father or that 
the charges against him were inspired by the alleged emails. 
 
 
 Regarding the first disputed OER, which covers his performance from October 1, 
2002,  to  January  31,  2003,  the  applicant  alleged  that  it  is  erroneous  and  unjust  and  asked  the 
Board to replace it with one prepared “for continuity purposes only” with all performance catego-
ries marked “not observed.”  To establish that an OER is erroneous or unjust, an applicant must 
prove that it was adversely affected by (a) a “misstatement of significant hard fact,” (b) a “clear 
and prejudicial violation of a statute or regulation,” or (c) factors that “had no business being in 
the rating process.”13  The Board begins its analysis in every case by presuming that the disputed 
OER is correct as it appears in the record, and the applicant bears the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it is erroneous or unjust.14  Absent evidence to the contrary, the 
Board presumes that the applicant’s rating chain prepared the disputed OER “correctly, lawfully, 
and in good faith.”15 
 
 
The  first  disputed  OER  contains  primarily  marks  of  “not  observed,”  no  positive 
marks  or  comments,  and  several  low  marks  supported  by  comments  about  his  behavior  during 
two port calls in December 2002 “creat[ing] the perception of an inappropriate relationship” and 
his misuse of alcohol causing him “to participat[e] in an inappropriate relationship.”  The appli-
cant alleged that the OER should be removed (a) because he did not have an inappropriate rela-
tionship, misuse alcohol, or lack courage during the reporting period, (b) because the substitute 
rating  chain  failed  to  include  positive  comments  and  marks  based  upon  his  OSF,  and  his  OER 
Reply  was  rejected  twice,  (c)  because  the  substitute  rating  chain  relied  on  information  from 
members of his original rating chain who were biased, (d) because the substitute rating chain was 
biased because of a close association with his CO and their possible involvement in the alleged 
cover up of alleged misdeeds by the CO regarding the migrant interdiction and because of their 
bias  against  the  applicant’s  father,  (e)  because  the  substitute  rating  chain  relied  on  the  IO’s 
report, which the Area Commander had ordered removed from his record, and (f) because he did 

6. 

                                                 
12 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b). 
13  Germano  v.  United  States,  26  Cl.  Ct.  1446,  1460  (1992);  Hary  v.  United  States,  618  F.2d  704  (Ct.  Cl.  1980); 
CGBCMR Dkt. No. 86-96. 
14 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b). 
15 Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 
1979). 

 

 

not receive due process during the investigation and so his self-incriminating statements to the IO 
should not have been considered.  The Board will address these allegations in order: 
 

 

 

(a) 

The record before the Board shows that during one port call, the applicant 
and a female crewmate—LTJG X—kissed after drinking one or more shots of tequila at the Tiki 
Bar  in  the  presence  of  several  other  crewmembers.    The  applicant  drank  alcohol  to  excess  that 
night and vomited in the bar twice.  The record further shows that a day or two later the applicant 
was counseled by his supervisor, the Operations Officer, about the kiss and the fact that he was 
creating  a  perception  of  an  “unacceptable  relationship”16  with  LTJG  X  as  there  was  a  rumor 
about  them  among  the  crew.    Despite  this  counseling,  during  another  port  call  about  ten  days 
later, the applicant was observed acting like a couple with LTJG X at a crew party and then slept 
alone in a bedroom with her the rest of the night and much of the next morning when he could 
have slept elsewhere in the “villa” they had rented, sought another key to his own room from a 
hotel employee or caretaker, or gone back to the cutter like his roommate LTJG C did.  Although 
the applicant alleged that the Operations Officer did not counsel him about the kiss and that the 
witnesses’  statements  from  the  investigation  should  be considered unreliable,17 the Board finds 
that he has not proved that the witnesses’ statements are unreliable or that the comments in the 
first  disputed  OER  about  his  misuse  of  alcohol  and  participation  in  an  “inappropriate  relation-
ship”18 are erroneous or unjust.   In addition,  whether the  applicant’s failure to  address his con-
duct  during the port calls  in  his  OSF shows a lack of courage is a matter of opinion that under 
these circumstances cannot be considered a misstatement of hard fact.  Nor has he proved that his 
alleged lack of courage was not perceived or manifested before the end of the reporting period. 
 
 
(b)  When the applicant decided to request disqualification of his entire rating 
chain because he thought they were preparing a biased OER after his NJP was overturned, CGPC 
granted  his  request  and  disqualified  the  Operations  Officer,  the  XO,  and  the  CO  of  the  cutter, 
who had observed his performance throughout the evaluation period.  The applicant alleged that 
his substitute rating chain should have assigned him positive performance marks and comments 
in the OER based on his own input for the OER on an OSF.  However, while an OSF should be 
reviewed  by  the  rating  chain,  an  officer’s  own  claims  about  his  performance  should  not  be  the 
sole  basis  for  evaluation  marks  because  an  officer  is  not  entitled  to  write  his  own  OER.    The 
substitute  rating  chain  in  this  case  could  not  seek  opinions  from  the  disqualified  rating  chain 
members, who might have confirmed the applicant’s claims on his OSF.  In the alternative, the 
applicant  argued,  the  substitute  rating  chain  should  have  marked  all  performance  categories  as 
“not  observed”  because  they  did  not  personally  observe  the  conduct  that  was  the  basis  for  the 
negative  marks  and  comments  in  the  OER.    However,  under  Article  10.A.2.  of  the  Personnel 
Manual, rating chain members are allowed to rely on “reliable reports” in preparing OERs, and 
the substitute rating chain has stated that they relied on information in the IO’s report.  Therefore, 

                                                 
16 Article 8.H.2.f. of the Personnel Manual states that a “romantic relationship” between any two members assigned 
to  the  same  cutter  constitutes  an  “unacceptable  romantic  relationship”  that  violates  Service  policy.    Article 
8.H.2.d.3.b. defines a “romantic relationship” as a “cross-gender sexual or amorous relationship.” 
17 The Board notes that the applicant argued that it should not consider the witnesses’ statements because of the Area 
Commander’s  memorandum  dated  March  24,  2003,  and  the  Commandant’s  instruction  for  boards,  COMDTINST 
1410.2, but this Board is not a part of or governed by the Coast Guard. 
18  This  phrase  is  not  defined  in  the  Personnel  Manual,  but  Article  4.F.3.d.  notes  that  “inappropriate  relationships” 
that “adversely affect a unit’s morale, good order and discipline, and its mission performance” may result in a CO’s 
relief for cause. 

 

 

 

 

 

(c) 

(d) 

the  fact  that no member of the substitute rating chain  had personally observed his  performance 
during the evaluation period does not render their marks and comments unjust or improper under 
the  Personnel  Manual.    Moreover,  the  Board  notes  that  when  the  Area Commander overturned 
the NJP, he specifically stated that the applicant’s underlying conduct should be documented in 
his  OER.    Regarding  the  applicant’s  claims  about  his  draft  OER  Reply,  he  has  not  shown  that 
CGPC  erred  in  requiring  him  to  remove  comments  that  presumably  failed  to  meet  the  require-
ments of Article 10.A.4.g. of the Personnel Manual. 
 
 
In light of the declarations of the substitute rating chain affirming that they 
relied upon the evidence in the IO’s report to prepare the first disputed OER and given the lack of 
any contrary evidence, the Board finds that the applicant has not proved that the substitute rating 
chain  based their marks and comments in the OER upon the opinions of the disqualified rating 
chain. 
 
 
The allegations of the applicant and his father about bias on the part of the 
substitute rating chain because of their prior interactions with his father are strongly contradicted 
in the declarations of the substitute rating chain.  His allegations that members of the substitute 
rating chain were close associates of the CO and may have been involved in the alleged cover-up 
of  the  migrant  interdiction  incident  are  unsupported.    The  applicant  has  failed  to  overcome the 
presumption  that  the  substitute  rating  chain  prepared  the  OER  in  good  faith19  or  to  prove  by  a 
preponderance of the evidence that any of the members of the substitute rating chain were biased 
against him or his father.  
 
 
The applicant alleged that the substitute rating chain’s reliance on informa-
tion in the IO’s report was improper because the Area Commander had ordered all references to 
his NJP to be removed from his record.  However, in the same letter that the Area Commander 
ordered all “references to the nonjudicial punishment” to be removed from the applicant’s record, 
he also stated that the applicant’s misconduct, which was revealed in the IO’s report, should be 
documented in  applicant’s OER.   In addition,  the Area Commander did not order the expunge-
ment  of the investigation.   Therefore, it is  clear that the intention and action of the Area Com-
mander was not to obliterate all evidence of the applicant’s misconduct, and the only documen-
tary evidence of his misconduct other than the NJP itself was the information in the IO’s report.   
 

(e) 

 

Moreover, while the Coast Guard may have responded to the Area Commander’s 
order by removing all references to NJP from the applicant’s record—even the IO’s recommen-
dation about NJP—rather than just the documentation of the NJP (the Court Memorandum  and 
the  letter  of  reprimand),  the  Board  disagrees  with  the  applicant’s  claim  that  the  Area  Com-
mander’s language required the IO’s report to be thrown out in its entirety as if it were only a part 
of the NJP.  The applicant argued that the purpose of the investigation was purely disciplinary—
that it was a “pre-disciplinary investigation”—and so the IO’s report should not exist apart from 
the NJP and must be thrown out  with the NJP.  However, the applicant has not shown that the 
investigation was anything other than a normal informal administrative investigation of an inap-
propriate  relationship  among  crewmembers.    Coast  Guard  regulations  permit  COs  to  convene 
informal  investigations,  which  may  ultimately  result  in  no  action  at  all;  any  number  of  purely 

                                                 
19 Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 
1979). 

 

 

administrative  actions,  such  as  transfers,  bad  OERs,  “alcohol  incident”  documentation,  or  psy-
chiatric  screening; mast/NJP;  court-martial; or various combinations thereof.   The fact  that one 
result of the investigation convened by the CO of the cutter was a mast proceeding for the appli-
cant does not mean that the investigation ceased to exist apart from the mast, had to be thrown 
out in its entirety as part of the NJP, and could not be used as a basis for administrative actions.  
The Area Commander’s letter required the Coast Guard to remove “all references to the nonjudi-
cial  punishment  from  your  [the  applicant’s]  record,”  and  the  applicant  has  not  proved  that  the 
substitute rating chain relied on the NJP in preparing the first disputed OER. 

 
 

Article 10.A.4.f.1. prohibits a rating chain from mentioning that an “officer’s con-
duct  is  the  subject  of  a  judicial,  administrative,  or  investigative  proceeding,  including  criminal 
and non-judicial punishment proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, … except 
as provided in Article 10.A.3.c. … These restrictions do not preclude comments on the conduct 
that is the subject of the proceeding.  They only prohibit reference to the proceeding itself.”  The 
applicant has not proved that the comments in the first disputed OER concerning his conduct that 
was the subject of the IO’s investigation are erroneous or unfair or contrary to any law, regula-
tion,  or  order  of  the  Area  Commander.    The  substitute  rating  chain  was  entitled  to  base  marks 
and comments in the OER on the information discovered in the investigation whether or not the 
NJP occurred or was overturned.20   
 

 

(f) 

The applicant alleged that the substitute rating chain’s reliance on informa-
tion  in  the  IO’s  report  was  improper  because  his  self-incriminating  statement  to  the  IO  was 
coerced  through illegal  confinement and  threats  of being charged with  rape.   The applicant  has 
not stated when his confinement began or how long it lasted.  Under Rule 305 of the Rules for 
Courts-Martial, a CO may confine a member for up to 72 hours if he is considering convening a 
court-martial and if he believes that a triable offense has been committed by the person to be con-
fined  and  that  confinement  is  necessary  under  the  circumstances.    The  applicant  alleged  in  his 
appeal of the NJP that LTJG P told him at the instigation of the Operations Officer that LTJG X 
might  accuse  him  of  rape.    He  submitted  nothing  to  support  this  allegation.    The  Area  Com-
mander wrote in his letter overturning the NJP that he was “concerned about the restrictions that 
were place on you [the applicant] before the mast, … and the circumstances that led to you pro-
viding an incriminating statement to the investigating officer.”  On the other hand, the applicant, 
a  well  educated  officer,  was  advised  of  his  rights  on  January  3,  2003,  including  his  right  to 
remain  silent,  and  indicated  by  his  signature  that  he  did  not  desire  to  consult  an  attorney  and 
wanted to answer questions and make a statement.  He began each of his formal statements for 
the IO with the following sentence:  “With full understanding of my rights, I make the following 
statement freely, voluntarily, and without any promises or threats made to me.”  Moreover, three 
hours after signing a summary of his answers to some of the IO’s questions, the applicant went to 
the IO’s stateroom and said he thought he could save LTJG X’s marriage but that, after learning 
what  LTJG  P  had  related,  he  “needed  to  come  clean  morally  and  professionally.”  This  adden-
dum,  which  the applicant  also  signed, shows that his  confession of January 6, 2003, was moti-
vated not  by threats  of rape charges  but  by his  realization that LTJG P had  told the IO a much 
more complete story of his behavior with LTJG X than he had confessed to; by his desire to save 
LTJG X’s marriage; and by his desire “to come clean.”  It  also indicates that the applicant was 
able to talk to LTJG P about the case, contrary to orders, and to visit the IO’s room to make his 

                                                 
20 Coast Guard Personnel Manual (COMDTINST M1000.6A), Arts. 10.A.4.c.4.d., 10.A.4.c.7.d., 10.A.4.f.1. 

 

 

third statement.  In light of these facts, the Board finds that the applicant has failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his confession to the IO was coerced or that it should be con-
sidered unreliable or improper  as a source of information for the substitute rating chain.  How-
ever,  even  if  one  assumes  that  his  self-incriminating  statements  to  the  IO  were  coerced  and  so 
ignores them, the other witnesses’ statements to the IO provided a sufficient basis for the substi-
tute  rating  chain  to  conclude  that  the  applicant  had  misused  alcohol  and  had  an  inappropriate 
relationship with LTJG X. 
 

7. 

The Board finds that the applicant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the first disputed OER was adversely affected by a “misstatement of significant hard fact,” a 
“clear and prejudicial violation of a statute or regulation,” or factors that “had no business being 
in the rating process.”21   
 
 
Regarding the second disputed OER, which covers the period February 1 to July 
13, 2003, the applicant argued that it should be removed because he was assigned on temporary 
orders to another unit throughout the evaluation period, and the command at his temporary unit 
provided a substantive concurrent OER for his record.  The regular OER is signed by the substi-
tute rating chain and appears much the same as a continuity OER, with all performance catego-
ries marked “not observed,” except that block 3 contains the following explanation for the sub-
stitute rating chain and the marks of “not observed”:  “Not observed marks reflect Reported On 
Officer’s approved request to disqualify the regular shipboard rating chain.  Mbr TAD to Coast 
Guard  Academy  for  duration  of  period.”    The  regular  and  concurrent  OERs  in  the  applicant’s 
record for this period conform to the applicable requirements of the Personnel Manual.  Article 
10.A.3.c.2.  provides  that  a  concurrent  OER  may  be  prepared  by  a  different  command  when  an 
officer is temporarily assigned away from his permanent duty station for at least sixty days, but a 
regular (or special) OER must still be prepared by the rating chain at the permanent duty station.  
Since the applicant’s rating chain at his permanent duty station (the cutter) had been disqualified, 
the substitute rating chain prepared the regular OER.  While the applicant’s record might appear 
better  if  he  had  been  issued  permanent  transfer  orders  upon  his  release  from  restriction  at  the 
Academy so that he would have one regular substantive OER for the evaluation period instead of 
a non-substantive regular OER and a substantive concurrent OER, the fact is that, February being 
off-season for assignments, he was issued temporary rather than permanent transfer orders and so 
the  combination  of  regular  and  concurrent  OERs  in  his  record  is  correct  under  the  Personnel 
Manual.    Nor  is  the  Board  persuaded  that  the  combination  is  unjust  simply because it  explains 
the signatures on the form by stating that the regular rating chain was disqualified.22  Therefore, 
the  applicant  has  failed  to  prove  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  either  disputed  OER 
was adversely affected by a “misstatement of significant hard fact,” a “clear and prejudicial vio-
lation of a statute or regulation,” or factors that “had no business being in the rating process.”23   
 
 
The applicant  asked the Board to  remove all documentation of his NJP from his 
record.  The Area Commander ordered that all references to the NJP be removed from his record.  

8. 

                                                 
21  Germano  v.  United  States,  26  Cl.  Ct.  1446,  1460  (1992);  Hary  v.  United  States,  618  F  .2d  704  (Ct.  Cl.  1980); 
CGBCMR Dkt. No. 86-96. 
22 See Sawyer v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 860, 868 (1989),  rev’d on other grounds, 930 F.2d 1577 (citing Reale v. 
United  States,  208  Ct.  Cl.  1010,  1011  (1976)  (finding  that  for  purposes  of  the  BCMRs  under  10  U.S.C.  § 1552, 
“injustice” is treatment by military authorities that “shocks the sense of justice”). 
23 Germano, at 1460. 

 

 

9. 

The Coast Guard appears to have followed this instruction by removing not only the usual docu-
mentation of the NJP itself—the Court Memorandum and letter of reprimand—but also the parts 
of the IO’s report that mentioned NJP.  Although the applicant argues that the NJP proceedings 
include  the  IO’s  investigation  in  its  entirety  so  that  the  entire  investigation  should  be  thrown 
away, the Board disagrees.  While the IO’s report certainly resulted in the NJP and was presuma-
bly  used  as  evidence  at  the  mast,  as  stated  in  Finding  6(e)  above,  the  investigation  was  a  pro-
ceeding unto itself with due process rights and procedures very different from those at mast.  As 
the  applicant  himself  pointed  out,  investigative  reports  are  not  even  filed  in  an  officer’s  PDR 
with  the Court Memorandum  of an NJP.  The Board ordered the Coast Guard to remove a few 
documents from his record that contained references to the mast, such as his request to disqualify 
his rating chain, in its final decision in the applicant’s original case.  He has not shown that there 
are any additional references to the NJP in his record.  Nor should any copy of this decision be 
entered in the applicant’s military record.   
 
 
The applicant asked the Board either to remove from his record the Page 7 dated 
April  11,  2003,  concerning  his  referral  to  a  Naval  hospital  for  alcohol  screening  or  to  add  the 
hospital’s written response to his record because he alleged that it states that he does not have a 
problem  and  indicates  that  the  screening  was  a  waste  of  time.    The  applicant  did  not  submit  a 
copy of this letter, however, and there is none in the record so its suitability for inclusion in his 
record cannot be determined.  He alleged that the Page 7, standing by itself, falsely indicates that 
he  has  an  “alcohol  problem.”    However,  the  record  shows  that  the  applicant  got  sufficiently 
intoxicated on tequila during one port call to vomit  twice in a public bar and risk his career by 
kissing  a  married  female  LTJG  in  front  of  several  other  crewmembers  and  then  ten  days  later, 
despite counseling, risked his career again after drinking alcohol by unnecessarily sharing a bed-
room alone with  the same married LTJG.  Therefore, the Board is  not  persuaded that the com-
mand  erred  or  acted  out  of  bias  when  it  referred  him  for  alcohol  screening  on  April  11,  2003.  
Either  incident  could  have  been  documented  as  an  “alcohol  incident”  by  his  command  under 
Article  20.A.2.d.1.  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  and  any  two  such  incidents  in  an  officer’s  record 
result  in  administrative  separation  from  the Coast Guard under Article 20.B.2.h.1.  Instead, the 
command  documented  his  misconduct  as  merely  an  “alcohol-related  situation”  under  Article 
20.B.2.d.  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  wisely  referred  him  for  alcohol  abuse  screening  (the  Board 
doubts that the hospital staff knew the full story of his alcohol abuse if, as he alleged, they con-
cluded that his screening was a waste of time), and prepared the required Page 7. 
 
 
The applicant alleged that he was improperly threatened with a Revocation Board 
that would have been illegal because on the proposed date of the Board,  May 25, 2004, he had 
more than three years of commissioned service.  He alleged that prior to the proposed Revocation 
Board, he was provided with a copy of Article 12.A.11. of the Personnel Manual with “pen and 
ink” changes purporting to change the time limitation for Revocation Boards from three years to 
five.  He noted that the Board relied on the original Article 12.A.11. limiting Revocation Boards 
to the first three years of commissioned service.24  In support of his allegation that the proposed 
Revocation  Board  would  have  been  illegal,  the  applicant  submitted  a  copy  of  the  notice  he 
received on January 29, 2004, with the pen and ink changes shown on a copy of Article 12.A.11.  
He also submitted a copy of Chapter 8.A.3. of COMDTINST M5215.6E, which states that when 

10. 

                                                 
24 The BCMR was unaware of the pen and ink changes made to Article 12.A.11. of the Personnel Manual during its 
first deliberations of the applicant’s case. 

 

 

11. 

amending  Coast  Guard  directives,  “Pen  and  ink  changes  are  no  longer  permitted.”    However, 
COMDTINST  M5215.6E  was  published  on  May  20,  2004,  long  after  the  pen  and  ink  changes 
had been made to Article 12.A.11., and it did not invalidate any previous pen and ink changes—
only future ones.  The pen and ink change to Article 12.A.11. was apparently made in response to 
Congress’s  amendment  of  14  U.S.C.  §  281  on  November  25,  2002,  extending  the  Secretary’s 
authority  to  revoke  commissions  from  three  years  to  five.    Although  the  applicant  argued  that 
extending the period for Revocation Boards from three years to five cannot be considered the sort 
of minor pen and ink change that was allowed under COMDTINST M5215.6D, the Board finds 
that changing the word “three” to “five” is exactly the sort of minor pen and ink change that was 
allowed  prior  to  the  issuance  of  COMDTINST  M5215.6E.    Therefore, the Board finds that the 
Coast Guard could legally have held a Revocation Board on May 25, 2004.  He has not proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence that his resignation was coerced in this regard. 
 
 
The  applicant  asked  the  Board  to  expunge  any  administrative  actions  taken  in 
whole  or  in  part  because  of  the  NJP  and  the  disputed  OERs,  such  as  the  planned  Revocation 
Board; to rescind his resignation; and to offer him reinstatement on active duty.  He alleged that 
he  is  entitled  to  the  rescission  of  his  resignation  and  reinstatement  on  active  duty  because  his 
resignation  was  coerced  and  involuntary  since  CGPC  illegally  intended  to  hold  a  Revocation 
Board and to show several enclosures to the IO’s report to the Revocation Board.  He argued that 
CGPC’s intentions in this regard violated the Area Commander’s order to expunge the NJP from 
his  records and  Article 12.A.11.b. of the Personnel  Manual.   The applicant  has not  proved that 
the  Coast  Guard  could  not  legally  have  held  a  Revocation  Board  on  May  25,  2004,  or  that  the 
Coast  Guard  intended  to  provide  the Revocation Board with  any documents  noting  that he had 
been taken to mast and awarded NJP by his CO.  For the reasons stated in Findings 6, 7, and 8, 
above,  the  Board  finds  that  CGPC’s  stated  intention  to  reveal  to  the  Revocation  Board  the 
disputed OERs and parts of the IO’s report that did not mention that the applicant was taken to 
mast  or  awarded  NJP  did  not  violate  the  Area  Commander’s  order  overturning  the  NJP  and 
expunging all references to the NJP from his records.   
 
In addition, the Board strongly disagrees with the applicant’s argument that Arti-
 
cle  12.A.11.b.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  limits  the  documents  that  a  Revocation  Board  may 
review  to  the officer’s PDR.   Although the applicant  alleged that showing the witnesses’ state-
ments to the Revocation Board was improper, paragraph 5.2. of COMDTINST 1410.2 states that 
while, “[t]he opinions of criminal investigators are not usually provided to a special board, … the 
statement of witnesses upon which those opinions are based should be provided to the  board if 
relevant  to  the  purpose  for  which  the  board  is  convened.”    The  applicant’s  involvement  in  an 
inappropriate  relationship  clearly  would  have  been  relevant  to  the  Revocation  Board’s  rec-
ommendation regarding his  retention  as an officer.  Moreover, Article 12.A.11.b. does not spe-
cify the “PDR,” as many other provisions in the Personnel Manual do.  A search of the Personnel 
Manual reveals many specific references to an officer’s PDR and many other references referring 
more generally to an “officer’s record.”  In particular, the Board notes that under regulations for 
“show  cause”  proceedings  for  officers  more  senior  than  the  applicant,  Article  12.A.15.f.  states 
that  “[a]t  any  time  and  place  Commander,  (CGPC)  may  convene  a  board  of  officers  to  review 
any  Regular  Coast  Guard  officer’s  record  to  decide  whether  the  officer  should  be  required  to 
show  cause  for  retention  on  active  duty.    Article  12.A.15.f.2.  states  that  “[a]  board  of  officers 
convened to review an officer’s records (a “determination board”) shall consist of at least three 
officers … .”  Then Article 12.A.15.f.3. more explicitly states that such a board will review “the 

12. 

 

 

officer’s PDR, the initiating officer’s recommendation, and all other available information rele-
vant to the reasons for separation to determine whether it should require the officer to show cause 
for  retention.”    When  the  Determination  Board  decides  that  the  officer  must  “show  cause”  for 
retention,  the  case  is  forwarded  to  a  Board  of  Inquiry,  which  is  required,  under  Article 
12.A.15.h.6.b.(4),  to  “consider  an  officer’s  record  as  a  whole  and  make  its  recommendation 
based on a preponderance of evidence.”  Therefore, the Board is not persuaded that whenever the 
Personnel Manual refers to an “officer’s record,” it means only the officer’s PDR, or that such a 
limiting interpretation of Article 12.A.11.b.3. is reasonable. 
 

Moreover, the Board notes that Article 12.A.11.b.1. requires the authority recommending 
the revocation to prepare and submit to CGPC a recommendation containing a variety of infor-
mation, including the reason for the recommendation and specific facts or circumstances relating 
to  the  officer’s  performance.    Nothing  prohibits  the  recommending  authority  from  including 
investigations  or  witnesses’  statements  as  part  of  his  recommendation  package,  which  is  also 
reviewed by the Revocation Board.   

13. 

 
Finally, the Coast Guard files a wide variety of significant documents about its members 
in a variety of files and databases for a variety of purposes.  To suggest that Revocation Boards 
cannot  consider  evidence  from  reports  of  investigations  into  officers’  misconduct  because  the 
Coast Guard has decided that it is not appropriate to retain such evidence (e.g., witnesses’ state-
ments) in officers’ PDRs and instead retains these reports in other filing systems is absurd.  The 
Board concludes that CGPC did not err or commit injustice when it advised the applicant that the 
Revocation  Board  would  be  entitled  to  see  certain  enclosures  to  the  IO’s  report.    He  has  not 
shown  that  he  was  subject  to  any  illegal  coercion  by  CGPC  when  he  submitted  his  request  to 
resign.25 
 
Even assuming arguendo that CGPC’s intention to submit the applicant’s and/or 
 
other  witnesses’  statements  to  the  Revocation  Board  was  erroneous,  the applicant’s resignation 
would not be rendered involuntary even though he resigned to avoid the Revocation Board and 
its possible consequences.  In Wright v. United States, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 96 *1 (April 7, 
2008),  the  plaintiff  had  appealed  his  NJP  for  sending  pornography  in  emails  from  his  Coast 
Guard computer on the basis that his punishment was too harsh.  While awaiting a delayed reso-
lution of his appeal, Wright submitted a request to retire because his enlistment was ending and if 
his  appeal  were  resolved  unfavorably  he  might  not  have  been  allowed  to  reenlist  or  extend  his 
enlistment  for  the  four  more  months  of  service  he  needed  to  attain  a  twenty-year  retirement.26  
The applicant’s request to retire was approved, and he was retired about one month after his NJP 
was overturned.  The BCMR had denied Wright’s request for constructive service credit because 
his “choice to request retirement rather than to wait for the outcome of his NJP appeal does not 
render his retirement involuntary.”27  In upholding the BCMR’s decision, the U.S. Court of Fed-
eral  Claims stated,  “a decision to  retire is  not  rendered involuntary merely because the service-

                                                 
25 See Christie v. United States,   207 Ct. Cl. 333, 337-8 (1975) (holding that a request to resign is not involuntary 
unless it is shown “(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no 
other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the results of coercive acts of the opposite party”). 
26 See Final Decision in BCMR Docket No. 2007-050. 
27 Id. 

 

 

member  is  faced  with  an  undesirable  choice.”28    In  Christie  v.  United  States,  207  Ct.  Cl.  333, 
337-8 (1975), the court held the following: 
 

This court has enunciated a principle, now firmly established, for determining whether a resigna-
tion is voluntarily tendered.  The element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is 
submitted under duress brought on by Government action. …  The tripart test for such duress is: 
“(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no 
other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the results of coercive acts of the opposite 
party.”  [Citations and indentation omitted.] 

●  ●  ● 

… Duress is not measured by the employee’s subjective evaluation of a situation.  Rather, the test 
is an objective one. …  While it is possible plaintiff, herself, perceived no viable alternative but to 
tender  her  resignation,  the  record  evidence  supports  CSC’s  finding  that  plaintiff  chose  to  resign 
and accept discontinued service retirement rather than challenge the validity of her proposed dis-
charge  for  cause.    The  fact  remains,  plaintiff  had  a  choice.    She  could  stand  pat  and  fight.    She 
chose not to.  Merely because plaintiff was faced with an inherently unpleasant situation in that her 
choice  was  arguably  limited  to  two  unpleasant  alternatives  does  not  obviate  the  voluntariness  of 
her resignation.  [Citations omitted.] 
 
This  court  has  repeatedly  upheld  the  voluntariness  of  resignations  where  they  were  submitted  to 
avoid threatened termination for cause. …  Of course, the threatened termination must be for good 
cause in order to precipitate a binding, voluntary resignation. … But this “good cause” requirement 
is met as long as plaintiff fails to show that the agency knew or believed that the proposed termi-
nation could not be substantiated.  [Citations omitted.] 
 

The “tripart  test” in  Christie  for an involuntary resignation is still used,29 and the applicant has 
not shown that he had no alternative but to resign or that CGPC’s intention to convene a Revo-
cation  Board  was  a  coercive  act  without  “good  cause.”    In  Tippett  v.  United  States,  185  F.3d 
1250, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the court held that “[a]n otherwise voluntary resignation or request 
for discharge is rendered involuntary if it is submitted under duress or coercion, or results from 
misrepresentation  or  deception  on  the  part  of  government  officers.”    The  Board  finds  that  the 
applicant  has  not  shown  that  his  resignation  was  submitted  under  duress  or  coercion  or  that  it 
resulted from misrepresentation or deception on the part of the Coast Guard.  Therefore, he has 
not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his resignation was involuntary and so he is 
not entitled to have his discharge voided or to be offered reinstatement on active duty. 
 

14. 

As alternative relief, the applicant asked the Board to correct his DD 214 to show 
that  he  was  separated  for  “Miscellaneous/General  Reasons”  with  separation  code  FND  rather 
than for “Substandard Performance” with separation code BHK.  He argued that he is entitled to 
this  relief  because  the  Commandant  overturned  the  recommendation  of  the  DRB  on  this  issue 
without explanation.  However, the DRB panel apparently did not see any of the evidence gath-
ered  by  the  IO.    Moreover,  the  BCMR  is  not  an  appellate  board  above  the  DRB  and  does  not 
overturn DRB decisions based upon whether the DRB provided or denied due process.  Instead, 
the  BCMR  conducts  de  novo  reviews  of  the  record  and  issues  its  own  independent  decisions.  
The  applicant  argued  that  his  narrative  reason  for  separation  is  erroneous  and  unjust  because 
                                                 
28 Wright v. United States, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 96 *19 (April 7, 2008), citing Cruz v. Dep't of Navy, 934 F.2d 
1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“This court has repeatedly held that the imminence of a less desirable alternative does 
not render involuntary the choice made.”).   See also Scarseth v. United States,  52 Fed. Cl. 458, 468 (2002) (citing 
Christie v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 333, 338 (1975), for its determination that “the exercise of an option to retire is 
not rendered involuntary by the impending prospect of a less desirable alternative”).  
29 See Scarseth v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 458, 468 (2002). 

 

 

most of the OERs in his record contain excellent performance marks and comments.  The Board 
notes  that  CGPC  could  have  chosen  other  notations,  such  as  “Unacceptable  Conduct”  (BNC), 
when he resigned in  lieu of further administrative separation proceedings.  The BHK denotes a 
resignation  in  lieu  of  further  proceedings  “when  a  member’s  performance  is  below  accepted 
standards.”  To find that the entries on the applicant’s DD 214 are erroneous or unjust, the Board 
would  have  to  determine  that  the  applicant’s  performance  as  an  officer  met  the  Coast  Guard’s 
accepted standards of performance for an officer.  Given the applicant’s behavior as revealed by 
the investigation, the Board will not do so. 

 
15. 

The applicant  asked the Board to  remove the DD 215 from his record.  The DD 
215 is clearly erroneous as it appears to change the discharge authority cited on his DD 214 from 
a  nonexistent  article  of  the  Personnel  Manual—Article  12.1.15.—to  one that concerns only the 
disability  discharges  of  enlisted  members—Article  12.B.15.    The  correct  discharge  authority  is 
Article 12.A.15.  Therefore, the Board finds that the DD 215 should be removed from his record, 
and  the  Coast  Guard  should  correct  his  DD  214  to  show  that  he  was  discharged  pursuant  to 
Article 12.A.15. 

 
16. 

The  applicant  made  numerous  allegations  with  respect  to  the  actions  of  various 
Coast  Guard  officers.    Those  allegations  not  specifically  addressed  above  are  considered  to  be 
not dispositive of the case.  While the CO apparently conducted the mast improperly by not pro-
viding the applicant with a mast representative and by not conducting the mitigation and extenu-
ation phase of the mast, these errors were cured when the Area Commander overturned the NJP 
and removed not only the documentation of it but all references to it from his record. 

 
17. 

Accordingly,  most  of  the  applicant’s  requests  should  be  denied  but  partial  relief 
should be granted by removing the erroneous DD 215 from his record and correcting his DD 214 
to show that he was discharged pursuant to Article 12.A.15.   

 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE]

 
 

 

 

ORDER 

 
 

 
 

No copy of this decision shall be placed in his record. 

 
 
The application of former LTJG xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction 
of  his  military  record  is  denied  except  that  the  Coast  Guard  shall  remove  the  DD  215  dated 
August  22,  2006,  from  his  record  and  correct  block  25  of  his  DD  214  to  show  that  he  was 
discharged pursuant to Article 12.A.15. of the Personnel Manual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  

 
 George A. Weller 

 

 
 
 Thomas H. Van Horn 

 

 
 
 Darren S. Wall 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 
 

 

 



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